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Chapter 1                                                               
Introduction 
The growth of the Web has allowed for increased numbers and variety of 
participants to interact online.  Many-to-many interactions enabled by large, 
heterogeneous, public online forums potentially create relationships that have value to 
participants.  Online interactions may be used to support traditionally offline activities, as 
is found in work on software to support group-based work activities (Ackerman and 
McDonald 1996; Olson and Olson 2001), but also may support novel types of 
interactions (Hollan and Stornetta 1992; Resnick 2001). 
However, as affordances of large-scale online conversations create new forms of 
benefit, they also create new problems for participants.  Information overload occurs 
when the number of messages a participant receives exceeds their capacity to consume 
those messages.  Information overload burdens not only the individual, but can also be 
unhealthy for the larger online social system as well (Butler 2001; Jones, Ravid et al. 
2004).  The anonymous nature of the online environment can also lead to anti-social 
behavior (Sproull and Kiesler 1991), which has had harmful consequences in earlier 
forms of online, many-to-many interactions (Curtis 1992; Turkle 1995; Rheingold 2000). 
Many methods have been used to manage online conversations, though these 
methods frequently do not scale to large-scale, many-to-many environments.  One 
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method that has not been addressed in depth is the use of technologically-enabled rating 
systems to provide feedback about the content and participants of online conversations.  
These rating systems, commonly referred to as recommender and reputation systems, are 
widely used on the Internet for sharing experiences with books1, consumer electronics2, 
and participants in online auctions3. 
While users in small online conversation forums might also benefit from the 
explicit rating of content, scale remains a factor in this analysis.  First, massive 
participation is often necessary to fuel sufficient ratings.  Second, readers in online 
forums likely use many cues to determine what to pay attention to.  Whether a comment 
includes links or bullet points, or whether it is long or short, might be cues that users 
employ to determine quality in an online conversation.  In small forums, it is possible to 
consider these cues, whereas in large forums the cues may become overwhelming and 
explicit ratings provide clarity. 
The central, organizing thesis of the dissertation is that rating systems may be 
usefully applied to large-scale online conversation systems, but that details of the 
technical features and patterns of use will affect their usefulness.  To address this theme, 
the dissertation examines three aspects of ratings use and provision on Slashdot.org4, a 
popular online news and discussion site with a large membership.   
This dissertation follows a form alternatively described as the “article” or 
“sandwich” method.  In this format, the three separate projects are individual inquiries, 
connected through the common of theme of ratings use in online communities.  The 






content of the dissertation, consequently, isn’t intended to address a single thesis, but 
rather the larger topic of how ratings may be applied to an online discussion: how they 
can be used to structure the reading experience; how they affect writers, and how the 
ratings themselves may be procured. 
The first project uses server log data to examine how ratings affect readers of 
comments on Slashdot.  Rating systems have to meet many conditions in order to operate 
effectively, such as sufficient number of raters, and agreement on the criteria of ratings 
(Terveen and Hill 2002; Dellarocas 2003).  Analyzing Slashdot’s system may show how 
rating systems applied to online discussions meet known requirements for recommender 
and reputation systems.  
The second project focuses on how new users are affected by feedback from 
ratings of their initial participation.  New users entering a persistent online discussion 
forum benefit by learning the standards of participation for the site.  Combining server 
information and survey data, this project displays the pattern of new user participation on 
the site, and the role of feedback from ratings, previous experience and observation in 
shaping that participation. 
The third project uses server and survey information to reveal how Slashdot users 
employ feedback provided through the rating system to customize how comments are 
displayed.  This inquiry examines in what ways users employ ratings, and makes 
recommendations for new types of view settings based on comment ratings. 
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Dissertation Outline 
In the context of the use of ratings to provide structure in persistent online 
conversations, this dissertation uses three studies that contribute to our understanding of 
how users in an online community use and provide ratings.  In the remainder of Chapter 
1, I describe Slashdot to provide context for later findings.  Chapter 2 reviews the history 
and salient features of previous online conversation systems, previous mechanisms for 
structuring online many-to-many systems, and the relevant research in the theory and use 
of recommender systems in other contexts.  In this review, I claim that other methods that 
have been used to manage online discussion systems have not been as scalable as the use 
of rating systems on Slashdot.  However, online recommender systems depend on 
sufficient and fairly applied ratings to be effective, which means that ratings on Slashdot 
should also be sufficiently and fairly applied to be an appropriate tool for use in online 
discussion systems.  Also, ratings on Slashdot should be useful to readers of content, and 
provide feedback to new users who are trying to learn the standards for participation on 
the site.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present studies that address these issues of ratings use and 
provision on Slashdot.   
Chapter 3 shows that most readers are using ratings to change how comments are 
viewed, but that a small portion of users make interface changes that decrease the impact 
of the ratings.  Although users are employing ratings to change how comments are 
displayed, there is some amount of friction that prevents them from doing so readily, as 
evinced by the tendency to make large changes in how comments are displayed rather 
than incremental changes.  By analyzing “lead users”, or users who seem more likely to 
make changes to viewing interfaces, there are some ways that this friction against using 
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ratings to change how comments are viewed may be overcome.  Some changes that users 
make indicate schemas for reader-types, which may be generated from the pattern of 
changes people make to the labels attached to comment ratings.  Additionally, this 
chapter describes how you can predict whether a change is warranted in the score at 
which comments are displayed based on the behavior of lead users who have already 
viewed the set of comments. 
Chapter 4 describes how previous experience, observation of the site, and 
feedback received from comment ratings and replies to comments may affect 
participation by new users.  Previous experience as measured by self-rated online forum 
expertise, computer expertise and education level had little association with either initial 
or continued participation on the site.  Observation, as measured by number of page 
views a user makes, was associated with the probability that a user would post a second 
comment, the score of that second comment, and the overall number of comments the 
new user made.  It was not associated with the final score of the first comment the user 
posted achieved through the moderation process, or the amount of time that passed 
between the posting of the first and the second comment.  Feedback, as measured by 
whether a user’s first comment was rated up, rated down or ignored, was associated with 
the amount of time that passed between posting the first and the second comment, and the 
score of the second comment.  It was not associated with the likelihood of posting a 
second comment, or the total number of comments made. 
Chapter 5 describes how although only 28% of comments on Slashdot receive any 
rating through moderation, the relatively wide range of starting scores for comments 
allows for a wide dispersion of final comment scores.  A conclusion from this finding is 
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that comment rating is used to separate particularly good and bad content from the 
average.  This chapter also describes that moderators generally agree on the disposition of 
a comment, as measured by variability in multiple ratings of a comment and scores 
achieved through a meta-moderation process.  Ratings that are scored as “unfair” by this 
meta-moderation process are usually reversed by subsequent moderations.  Chapter 5 also 
shows that comments that occur late in the life of a discussion or below the top thread 
level are less likely to be rated at all, and less likely to have an “unfair” moderation 
reversed. 
Chapter 6 synthesizes these findings and ties them back to the core argument of 
ratings use in persistent online conversations.  Two general conclusions drawn from the 
studies are the importance of starting scores that comments receive based on user identity 
and the role of moderation labels as providing additional information in the ratings 
process.  This leads into a discussion of implications for future ratings of online 
discussion forums.  I finish by discussing the limitations of this set of studies, and 
suggesting future research designs in this area. 
Contributions 
The contributions of this dissertation can be divided into overall contributions of 
the combined work, and specific contributions in each chapter.  This section will begin by 
enumerating the contributions of the overall, descriptive work about Slashdot and its 
readers. Then, it lists separate contributions from the different projects that comprise the 
dissertation; these contributions include empirical findings, conceptual schemes for 
thinking about the use and impacts of ratings, and methodological innovations. 
Overall contributions 
7 
 There are five contributions made by the overall work presented here.  First, this 
is the first examination of how the Slashdot moderation system operates.  Although some 
technical reports have explained the mechanics of the Slashdot system, and the source 
code is open for inspection, no work has examined the actual use of that system or how 
different features affect use.  Describing Slashdot contributes possible design guidance to 
online community practitioners interested in repeating Slashdot’s success.  Describing 
Slashdot helps researchers in two ways as well.  Although two dissertations have studied 
Slashdot previously (Halavais 2001; Poor 2004), neither provided full descriptions of 
features or use, as these works were concerned with Slashdot outcomes more than 
operations.     Several recent studies, both in academia and the public press, have 
compared virtual communities of various sorts to Slashdot (Rheingold 2003; Dave, 
Wattenberg et al. 2004; Gillmor 2004; Viegas, Wattenberg et al. 2004; Bryant, Forte et 
al. 2005).  Providing details about Slashdot helps those who make comparisons to that 
community in the future.  In addition to helping future researchers of this particular 
community, the description of Slashdot helps add essential information to a growing 
body of work on online communities in general.  Studies of Usenet (Smith 2002), MUDs 
(Bruckman 1997), Wikipedia (Bryant, Forte et al. 2005) and blogs (Facca and Lanzi 
2005) all add to an understanding of the different social practices inherent in public, 
online discussions.  Adding Slashdot to that mix is important because of the site’s large 
size, public nature, longevity, and unusual use of tools like ratings systems. 
Second, this is the first study to describe the Slashdot user population, which is 
shown in Appendix A as responses to the Slashdot user survey.  Before that study, little 
was actually known about the characteristics of Slashdot users.  Again, these findings are 
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of use to those studying Slashdot in the future, and those comparing Slashdot to other 
sites.  The description of user characteristics also adds to the literature on online 
community and Internet participation in general.  While some surveys of general 
populations address online community use (Horrigan 2001), and a few surveys of specific 
online communities address use (Preece, Nonnecke et al. 2004), the main method for 
describing users of online communities in the past has focused on interview data and 
observation.  The survey of Slashdot users is the first to describe the demographics of 
users who participate in online discussion.  While these users may be idiosyncratic to the 
site, their description adds to future studies of online community users, and will allow for 
differentiation to be made between users of different types of communities. 
The third contribution made by the overall work is the description of a relatively 
unique type of recommender system.  Most recommender systems aggregate numerical 
ratings from users (Terveen and Hill 2002).  When a Slashdot moderator rates a 
comment, they are moving the score of the comment higher or lower than it currently is.  
In addition, moderators do not actually assign scores of +1 or -1 to those comments, but 
rather choose from a list of labels like “Insightful” or “Offtopic” that then affect the score 
of the comment.  This is a variant of recommendation that can’t be found in the literature, 
and as such contributes to the literature through the description of its use and application.  
Besides extending the literature on online ratings systems, describing the Slashdot 
recommender variant is of use to designers of online communities interested in applying 
ratings to their endeavors. 
Fourth, this works describes how Slashdot “pre-rates” comments by assigning 
them starting scores based on the previous history of the user posting them, as described 
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more fully in Chapter 2.  The literature on recommender systems highlights a problem 
with making recommendations when no content has been rated yet (Terveen and Hill 
2002; Herlocker, Konstan et al. 2004), referred to as the “cold start” problem (Schein, 
Popescul et al. 2002).  If the content hasn’t been rated, then it is hard to make 
recommendations, especially in the case of collaborative filtering which depends on 
many ratings to make personalized recommendations.  This could be an especially 
serious problem in an online conversation, where posting happens quickly and the 
lifetime of a conversation thread is short.  Slashdot’s use of pre-ratings offers a possible 
solution to this cold start problem, by offering a spread of scores at the moment of 
comment creation. 
Fifth, this work extends research in large-scale online conversations from Usenet 
to Web discussions.  Previous work on large-scale, online discussion forums have 
focused on Usenet interaction (Whittaker, Terveen et al. 1998; Smith 1999; Sack 2000; 
Butler 2001; Jones, Ravid et al. 2002), because it was a unique example of massive 
participation, and was decentralized for more convenient data collection.  Web-based 
online discussions like Slashdot have slightly different design characteristics than Usenet, 
which may affect how participation occurs.  This work shows that Slashdot discussions 
have many of the same characteristics of Usenet posting, in terms of thread depth for 
example.  This provides evidence that findings from Usenet research can be extended into 
Web-based discussions. 
Contributions in Chapter 3 
 There are three contributions to the literature made in Chapter 3.  The first 
contribution of this chapter is to divide users into categories of those who change defaults 
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to take advantage of ratings, those who leave default settings intact, and those who 
change their settings to suppress the use of scores.  Both cognitive psychologists and 
economists have reflected that people presented with more information than they can 
process will often make sub-optimal choices for the sake of reducing their cognitive 
burden.  This tendency has been attributed to human limits of cognition (Landauer 1991), 
and may be associated with the theory of “satisficing” (March and Simon 1958) wherein 
users make “good enough” decisions to save themselves the cognitive work of deciding 
between all possible choices.  This work provides an example of how users do this in an 
online discussion system with many options for changing default settings, and associates 
user characteristics with that behavior. 
The second contribution of this study is to identify the concept of personalization 
clusters based on the changes users have made to the value of moderation labels in the 
Slashdot system.  Content recommender systems have traditionally made a single 
recommendation to the entire user population.  An example is rating a movie as “4 star”, 
which does not take user motivations into account.  Collaborative filtering systems have 
personalized recommendations by matching a user’s preferences with other users that 
have stated similar preferences, and some research has created “ontologies” of use in 
collaborative filtering systems by looking at similarities between ratings (Middleton, 
Shadbolt et al. 2004).  This work extends that to the field, and shows how groups can be 
imputed from interface settings, as well as from stated preferences.  The schema based 
recommendations proposed in Chapter 3 show that users modify the scores of comments 
based on the labels they received through the moderation process, and that they change 
groups of labels.  For example, a user who increases the score of comments labeled as 
11 
“Insightful” might also choose to decrease the scores of comments labeled as “Troll”.  By 
seeing what clusters of modifications are made by users, one can propose an alternative 
approach by which ratings are used to recommend content to a small set of user types, 
rather than to each individual user personally or to a global population. 
A third contribution of this work is to include user story views as a unit of 
analysis, providing a novel perspective of user interaction with online content.  Other 
analyses of online community readership have been focused at all the behavior by a user, 
or at the conversation thread level (Whittaker, Terveen et al. 1998; Smith 2002).  
Combining users and conversations as a single unit of analysis permits a different 
granularity of description, which in this case is used to understand in how many of the 
conversations they read a user decided to make threshold changes.  This formulation 
could be of use to other researchers of online discussions interested in how users behave 
differently across different units of interaction. 
The fourth contribution of this chapter is to the literature on adaptable vs. adaptive 
interfaces.  Adaptable interfaces are those that a user can change to tailor software to their 
use, where adaptive interfaces anticipate needs of the user. The literature on human-
computer interaction has a long debate on the merits of adaptable vs. adaptive computer 
interfaces (Findlater and McGrenere 2004). Maclean (MacLean, Carter et al. 1990) 
theorized several types of users and how they would tailor interfaces differently given 
their use.  Empirical work on preference setting has shown that most users rely on system 
defaults rather than change the user interface (Cypher 1991; Mackay 1991; Page, 
Johnsgard et al. 1996).  Some researchers have used artificial intelligence agents to 
anticipate user needs in computer interfaces (Fischer and Girgensohn 1990; Fischer and 
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Reeves 1992), though this approach can sometimes not match user activities.  This work 
adds to that literature by demonstrating the feasibility of having the activities of users 
more likely to change interfaces act as the adaptive function in dynamically changing 
interfaces.  The behavior of these “lead users” in changing how they view comments on 
Slashdot is a good predictor of when other people will also make a change.  This means 
that adapting interfaces based on the behavior of other users may be an effective 
technique in customizing interfaces. 
Contribution in Chapter 4 
 There are three contributions to the literature to be found in Chapter 4.  The first 
contribution of this study was to define the measures of participation for new users in a 
persistent online forum.  By combining measures of comment scores, rate of posting 
comments, probability of posting a second comment and overall comments I was able to 
analyze different types of participation by new users on Slashdot.  This may be of use to 
researchers who study other online communities as measures of new user outcomes.   
 The second contribution to be found in Chapter 4 is to show that observation and 
feedback both play roles in understanding new user behavior.  Previous work on new 
users in online communities have largely focused on how long new users occupy an 
online discussion forum (Butler 2001), or conduct qualitative studies of interactions in 
environments like Multi-User Dungeons (Curtis 1992; Muramatsu and Ackerman 1998; 
Reid 1999).  By examining the role of alternative explanations of learning for new users, 
this work is able to indicate some possibilities for designers of online communities who 
need to socialize new users.   For example, online community practitioners might be able 
to create socio-technical tools that encourage new users to observe experienced 
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participants.  Designers may also decide to target new users for initial feedback that 
might shelter them from initial discouragement, or perhaps increase the drop out rate if 
that is seen as good for the community. 
 A third contribution of Chapter 4 is to provide online examples of mechanisms 
articulated by the literature on situated learning.  Recent work on Wikipedia found that 
new users become engaged with the site at least partially by interacting with more 
experienced users (Bryant, Forte et al. 2005).   This is consistent with the perspectives of 
communities of practice (Wenger 1998) and situated learning (Lave and Wenger 1993) in 
which novices interact with experts in various degrees until becoming expert themselves.  
In this chapter, we found that neither being replied to, nor receiving ratings from other 
users predicted whether the user would return to post a second comment.   However, 
observation of others was an important predictor as measured by the number site visits 
the new user made.  This extends the work on how new users are socialized in new 
communities by breaking down different types of interaction the new user may have with 
others. 
Contributions in Chapter 5 
 There are three contributions to the research literature in Chapter 5.  The first 
contribution in the chapter is to validate the theory of herding or information cascades in 
comment ratings on Slashdot.  Herding in this context is an incorrect consensus reached 
because moderators are influenced by previous moderations either to remain silent or to 
contribute another moderation in the same direction (Banerjee 1992).  In Slashdot, we 
find a decreased chance for reversing this herding process when comments are later in the 
life of a thread, deeper in the thread structure, or start with a lower score.  Overall, only 
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half of initial moderations that are rated as “unfair” by the meta-moderation process are 
reversed by subsequent moderation.  This confirms that the theory of herding applies to 
everyday practice.  It also adds an example of the theoretical problem with ratings that 
there is a benefit for producers of ratings to wait until others have done the work before 
evaluating the content (Avery, Resnick et al. 1999).   Both researchers interested in 
herding behavior, and practitioners worried about the effects of initial ratings on scoring 
outcomes may be interested in how the disposition of comments in Slashdot affects 
herding. 
 A second, methodological contribution in Chapter 5 is the concept of the “half-
conversation life”, or the elapsed time in which half the comments are posted.  This is a 
potentially useful measure of the rate of activity within an online discussion, particularly 
in online systems that may be asynchronous, but have rapid posting activity early in the 
life of the conversation.   
 A third contribution is the confirmation of theory on rating systems that says that 
people using ratings may not trust the rating system if evaluations are not equally applied 
to all content (Dellarocas 2003).  We find in Chapter 5 that comments late in the life of a 
conversation, or deep within threads do not receive the adequate attention.  This may 
relate to the underprovision problem (Avery, Resnick et al. 1999), in which the cost of 
evaluating and assigning scores is exacerbated by costs imposed by the interface.  For 
example, having to scroll to the bottom of a string of comments, or click on a thread to 
access comments deeper in the structure, add cost to the evaluation that unbalances the 
equal provision of ratings. 
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Slashdot 
This section describes Slashdot in detail to provide context to the findings 
presented in subsequent chapters.  Slashdot is a news and commentary site dedicated to 
technology issues, especially those focused on open source software.  It attracts about a 
over 600,000 unique visitors a day, as measured by unique IP addresses requesting pages 
from the site. Paid editors select about two dozen news stories each day to appear on the 
site, providing a one paragraph summary for each and a link to an external site where the 
story originated. Each story becomes the topic for a threaded discussion among the site’s 
users.   Most of the commentary occurs in the first few hours after a story is posted, in 
part because the story loses its prominence on the front page of the site as other stories 
are posted.  Around 75,000 comments are posted each day to the site.  This section will 
provide details on the operation of Slashdot, and context for the chapters to follow. 
Slashdot History 
Rob “CmdrTaco” Malda was a Hope College student in 1997 when he posted 
static web pages to his personal computing space, the content of which was typically 
related to stories he had found around the Web and found to be interesting.  Calling the 
site “Chips & Dips”, he would get email from friends about things they had found as 
well.  The site grew in popularity, and in October 1997 it was moved from college servers 
to a dedicated server, registered as “Slashdot.org”. 
“Being the cocky young lad that I was, I decided that I would register the most 
unpronounceable name I could think of.  I didn’t know exactly what I would be 
putting on my site, but I knew that whatever it was, it was going to be a creation 




By April of 1998, Malda had enlisted the help of friends to create a publishing 
interface for the Web, using mod_perl and MySQL as key elements of the system.  The 
basic design of the site was to post links to news or information somewhere else on the 
Web, with a small description of what could be found at that location.  Visitors to the site 
could post comments about the item in a threaded discussion format using database 
driven forms provided by the site.   
“Building on Usenet, IRC, and even MUDs, it (Slash) creates a reasonable system in 
which the knowledgable and the foolish can mingle, swap places, and somehow 
produce something that is worth reading.  Frankly, it scares me that it works as well 
as it does.” (chromatic, Aker et al. 2002) 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Slashdot circa 1997 
 
 
As the user base grew, instances of misbehavior and information overload also 
increased.  In order to control these effects, Malda and his colleagues programmed a form 
of moderation in which comments received scores assigned by themselves that would 
indicate the relative value of those comments.  As the number of comments posted to the 
site increased, they extended the ability to moderate comments in this manner to 25 
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trusted users, and then to 400.  Eventually, they made all registered users eligible for 
moderation privileges. 




Stories are submitted to Slashdot by users, who find them from other news 
sources on the Web.  Between 300 and 400 stories are submitted per day to the site, 
though many of them point to duplicate sources.  Editors, paid employees of Slashdot, 
review the submissions, checking the originating link and reading the article referenced.  
Figure 1.2 shows the interface for selecting stories to appear on the site.  From this list of 
stories, editors choose around two dozen to appear on the site over the course of the day, 
depending on the news cycle.  Not all Slashdot content points to other sources on the 
Web.  Original content includes user-provided book reviews, interviews in which 
questions are generated by Slashdot users, articles or reports submitted by editors and 
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users, and the “Ask Slashdot” section in which a user presents a question to the 
readership, which can answer in the discussion forum.  
Figure 1.3: Slashdot index page. 
 
Stories appear in chronological sequence, with a summary written by the 
submitting user, a timestamp, a link to the original content, and the name of the editor 
who posted the story.  Figure 1.3 shows the index page for Slashdot, displaying how 
stories are arranged on the site.  Not all Slashdot stories appear on the main page, called 
the “index” page.  Slashdot has separate sections for topics like “Games” and “Books” 
where additional stories not deemed of general interest are posted.  All stories that appear 
on the index page also appear in the topic pages, but not vice versa. 
The gray arrow in Figure 1.3 shows the main link to accessing the user comments 
area.  By selecting “Read More”, the user is taken to a string of comments posted by 
other users.  Entering the user comments area allows the user to both read and post 
comments to the discussion.  Users may reply either to the story, which creates a top-
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level comment, or to one comment, in which case their posts appear deeper within the 
threaded structure.  Figure 1.4 highlights the user interface for adding comments to a 
thread and the resulting structure.  Both registered and anonymous users may post 
comments to the site.  A story may be commented on for up to two weeks after it has 
been posted, but as shown in Chapter 5, most commenting happens during the first few 
hours that a story has been posted.  After the story moves from the index page into the 
archive, commenting activity drops precipitously. 
Figure 1.4: Interface for commenting on Slashdot. 
 
After a comment has been posted, it can be rated by a “moderator”.  Slashdot 
users achieve moderator eligibility by having a positive reputation, which results from 
their participation on the site.  In a recent week in October 2005, 67,000 registered users 
were eligible to become moderators and about 5,000 per day were selected. When 
selected, a user is given five moderation points, to be used within three days.  Moderators 
are chosen by an automated script, which periodically assigns moderator privileges based 
on the number of comments in the system.   Users are notified of their moderator status 
Option for commenting 
directly on the story. 
Option for replying to 
another comment. 
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through a note that appears on the top of the index page, as well as by the addition of a UI 
element that appears in comment pages.  Figure 1.5 shows the interface through which 
users are notified of their moderator status.   
Figure 1.5: Notification of moderator status 
 
A moderator rates a comment by assigning a label to it, rather than a numerical 
value.  Users choose from a list of descriptors for the comments, such as “Offtopic”, 
“Troll”, “Insightful”, “Funny”, or “Overrated”, each corresponding to a -1 or +1 
adjustment in the score of the comment.  Unlike most rating systems that employ an 
absolute scale (e.g. 1-5 stars), Slashdot moderation is relative to a comment’s score.  
Moderators are intended to assign rating labels to comments that they think deserve a 
higher or lower score.  Table 1.1 lists the labels that can be used in the moderation 




















  Figure 1.6 shows the interface and label options as they appear to moderators in 
a comment stream.  Comments start at a score ranging from -1 to +2, depending on the 
user posting the comment.  Comments made by registered users with negative reputation 
in the system start at -1, those by anonymous users start at 0, those by registered users 
with normal reputation start at 1 and those by registered users with high reputation start at 
+2.  Final scores for comments can range from –1 to +5, depending on starting scores and 
modifications made by the moderators.   
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Figure 1.6:  Interface for moderating comments on Slashdot. 
 
Besides affecting the score of the comment being rated, moderation also affects 
the system-tracked reputation of the user who posted the comment.  Each user who 
creates a profile on the site has a reputation score, called a “karma” score by the Slashdot 
moderation system.  These scores range from -50 to +50, though users themselves only 
see labels like “Positive” or “High” when viewing their karma.  Labels were introduced 
after the creation of the karma system to prevent the gaming of reputation that was made 
easier by access to the numerical score.  Besides the gain or loss of karma points through 
the moderation process, users may gain karma through reading stories and having stories 
they’ve submitted posted to the site.  A person’s karma score affects the starting score of 
comments they write, and how often the user is eligible to moderate others’ comments. 
To “remove bad moderators from the M1 (moderator) eligibility pool and reward 
good moderators with more delicious mod points” (Malda 2003), Slashdot developed a 
meta-moderation system.  Meta-moderators are presented with a set of moderations that 
Drop down menu for 
choosing moderation 
labels for comments. 
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they then rate as either “fair” or “unfair” or neutral. For each moderation, the meta-
moderator sees the original comment and the reason assigned by the moderator (“Troll”, 
“Funny”, etc.), and the meta-moderator can click to see the context of comments 
surrounding the one that was moderated.   The final score of the comment is not shown, 
nor are the other ratings of that comment, just the individual moderation.  Consequently, 
moderations that use the labels ‘Underrated” or “Overrated” are not eligible for meta-
moderation.  Every rating, other than those labeled as “Underrated” or “Overrated” that is 
made on Slashdot receives five ratings through meta-moderation.  A wider portion of the 
user base is eligible to participate in meta-moderation than is eligible for moderator 
status, with the only requirement being that the user not have a negative reputation score.  
Thus, more meta-moderation occurs than moderation.  Figure 1.7 shows the interface for 
meta-moderating comments.  Each user chosen to meta-moderate receives ten 
moderations to evaluate.  Meta-moderation is used by the editorial staff to identify 
moderators who are consistently being rated as “unfair”, and may affect how often or 
whether the user seen as unfair gets to moderate in the future. 
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Figure 1.7: Interface for meta-moderating on Slashdot. 
 
In abstract, Slashdot’s comment and moderation system resembles a tree 
structure, with one story receiving many comments, one comment receiving (potentially) 
many moderations, and one rating assigned by moderation receiving many meta-
moderations. 
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Figure 1.8: An abstracted view of contributions users make to Slashdot. 
 
Table 1.2 summarizes the different types of users that may be mentioned, 
describing their role on the site and eligibility requirements.   There are eight active 
editors currently.  There are over 900,000 registered users, though only around 80,000 are 
active on any given day.  There are around 575,000 anonymous users who visit the site 
on average per day.  The numbers of both moderators and meta-moderators are dependent 









Table 1.2: Types of Slashdot user. 
User type Description 
Editors Paid Slashdot staff responsible for selecting stories to appear 
on the site.  Also have unlimited moderator privileges.  
Currently 8 editors work on the site. 
Registered users Slashdot users who have created accounts on the site.  These 
users may read, post comments, create journals, and are 
eligible for moderation and meta-moderation.  There are 
currently over 900,000 registered users. 
Anonymous users Slashdot users who do not create accounts.  These users may 
only read and post comments.  Slashdot terms these users 
“Anonymous Cowards”. 
Moderators Registered users who are selected to rate comments.  
Moderators are chosen from registered users who have positive 
reputation, have visited the site in the past week, and are in the 
92.5% of oldest user accounts. 
Meta-moderators Registered users who are selected to rate moderations.  Meta-
moderators are chosen from registered users who do not have 
negative reputation, and have visited the site in the past week. 
  
 Figure 1.9 shows the overall lifecycle of activity on Slashdot.  Users may affect 
their settings in their personal profiles at any time, but most activities are sequential, with 
story submissions leading to story posts, then to comments, moderation of comments and 
then meta-moderation of the moderations. 
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Figure 1.9: Overview of Slashdot story and commenting lifecycle. 
 
Slashdot conversation characteristics 
Part of Slashdot’s editorial policy is that no posts are deleted from the database.  
“We believe that discussions in Slashdot are like discussions in real life- you can't 
change what you say, you only can attempt to clarify by saying more. In other words, you 
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can't delete a comment that you've posted, you only can post a reply to yourself and 
attempt to clarify what you've said.”(Malda 2003)  This exacerbates the information 
overload problem, as Slashdot received high traffic and is committed to retaining all 
comments. 
Another policy of the site creators is that anonymous posting be allowed within 
the system.  “We think the ability to post anonymously is important. Sometimes people 
have important information they want to post, but are afraid to do it if they can be linked 
to it. Anonymous Coward (ed. Slashdot term for anonymous users) posting will continue 
to exist for the foreseeable future.” (Malda 2003)    
These features are salient because it creates an online conversation system with 
low barriers to enter the conversation, high message load, few constraints on user 
misbehavior, and the ability to change pseudonyms frequently.  As will be shown in the 
background section, these features would usually be associated with breakdowns in the 
online conversation.  Slashdot’s rating system has allowed the site to preserve these 
features while still providing structure for participants.   
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Chapter 2                                                               
Theoretical Motivation and Background 
 Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have separate sections that motivate the individual inquiries.  
This section, rather than replicating statements made in the individual chapters, addresses 
general themes related to the use of rating systems in online conversations.  This 
narrative is intended to show that there is a history of large-scale, many-to-many 
interactions with outcomes salient to the current state of online conversation, that 
previous methods of structuring these systems have not allowed a scale that should be 
encouraged, and that recommender and reputation systems may be a useful tool for these 
systems if such systems can overcome known barriers like the need for sufficient rating 
and the tendency of raters to “herd” after initial ratings. 
Type of online discussion 
This dissertation considers a particular type of online interaction, which is large-
scale, public, text-based, many-to-many and persistent.  This section provides 
background information about the features of these systems and how these types of 
online interactions have been described in that past. 
This work is concerned with online communication that takes place 
simultaneously among many participants, in forums where messages are relatively 
persistent, where participation is publicly visible at least to other members of the forum, 
and where the main method of interaction is typically through textual messages.  Often, 
these types of online conversation systems involve anonymous or pseudonymous 
participation, large numbers of participants, and are topic centered, though these latter 
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characteristics are not necessary conditions.  Although online discussion participants may 
choose to meet offline, the environment itself is designed as a wholly online space, not 
support for pre-existing offline activities.  The relative permanence of messages and the 
many-to-many focus of online discussions  differentiate them from instant messaging, 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC), one-to-one email, intranet messaging systems, and typical 
blogs that are used as a broadcast mechanism.  Examples of online discussion systems to 
which this research may apply include email distribution lists, Usenet newsgroups, and 
Web-based bulletin boards.  Often, online discussions are elements of more complex 
online interactions, like scientific collaborations, multi-player online games, or online 
content creation sites like Wikipedia5 or the Debian6 Project. 
The most common shorthand term for online conversation systems like this is 
“virtual community”, with alternatives being “online community” and “digital 
community”.  The term “virtual community” is traced to Rheingold’s 1993 description of 
interactions on a popular Bulletin Board System (BBS) named the WELL (Rheingold 
2000)7.  The use of the “community” has proven contentious, with a great deal of popular 
attention debunking (Galston 1999) and defending (Powazek 2002) whether online 
community is a real form of community or not.   Matei (Matei 2005) traces how the term 
“community” in the phrase was an intentional construct of the participants of the WELL, 
tracing discourse in that space on the subject.  The WELL, a derivation of a liberal 
newsletter called the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Catalog, wanted to encourage the new 
medium to be seen as a communitarian enterprise. 
                                                 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page 
6 http://www.debian.org/ 
7 The WELL has become a web community owned by Salon (http://www.well.com/). 
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Rheingold (Rheingold 2000) updated his 1993 book in 2000, adding a chapter 
where he claimed he would have avoided the word “community” had he known the 
controversy involved.  The term he preferred in the updated version of his book was 
“online social network”.  Online social networks are most fully covered by Barry 
Wellman (Wellman 1997; Wellman and Gulia 1999), who de-emphasizes the emotional-
affective dimensions of online interactions evoked by the term “community” in favor of 
behavioral and relational measures common in social network analysis.  Others (Wasko 
and Faraj 2000) have applied work on “communities of practice” (Wenger 1998) to the 
online medium, focusing on the information and expertise exchange that can happen in 
online interactions rather than affective bonds. 
Other terms used by researchers avoiding the virtual community debate include 
“flash forums” (Dave, Wattenberg et al. 2004) and “virtual publics” (Jones and Rafaeli 
1999), emphasizing the short lifespan of many online conversations.    According to 
Jones et al (Jones, Ravid et al. 2004), virtual publics are “symbolically delineated, 
computer-mediated spaces… that enable a potentially wide range of individuals to attend 
and contribute to a shared set of computer-mediated interpersonal interactions.”  This 
term highlights the affordances of being public, namely wide participation, low barriers 
to entry and differing levels of anonymity. 
Although these terms separately evoke important characteristics of persistent 
online interactions, none sum them up adequately to abandon the term “virtual 
community” or take precedence over precise, if awkward, descriptions of specific online 
social systems. 
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Many types of online technologies have been termed “virtual communities” in the 
past.  Large email distribution lists, Usenet newsgroups, Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) 
and Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) have all been described as virtual communities at 
one point or another.  Each of these systems allow for many-to-many, technologically-
mediated interactions between participants, so share many characteristics of interest here.  
The following section briefly describes the history of online communication, then 
describes these virtual communities in more depth.  The designers of Slashdot had 
participated in these different systems before creating the site, and those experiences 
shaped how they developed the rating system on Slashdot (chromatic, Aker et al. 2002).  
Also, the next section will highlight how older online discussion systems had illustrated 
the problems of scale in online conversations, the need to socialize newcomers to 
persistent online systems, the types of user misbehavior that could occur online and the 
resultant need for governance mechanisms, and the mechanisms that were developed in 
these cases. 
History of online discussion 
From its inception, the Internet has been a communication device. The value of 
ARPANET was originally seen to be in resource sharing, i.e. the ability of remote 
researchers to use software hosted on the large mainframe machines at the time.  Abbate 
(Abbate 2000) argues that ARPANET would be a minor footnote had its use not switched 
from resource sharing to communications via email.  By the middle of the 1970’s, a 
significant population of users was communicating online, in various contexts.  As more 
nodes were attached to ARPANET, email communication continued to grow.   
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Projects related to ARPANET were intended to have a research focus, though 
offtopic endeavors, like a science fiction discuss list, were tolerated.  As the ARPANET 
developed and more sites were added to the network, the switch from research to 
communication increased  (Ritchie and Thompson 1974; Hafner and Lyon 1996).  During 
this period, email distribution lists and conferencing systems were developed, 
foreshadowing information overload problems that would recur in later online 
conversation systems. 
By the late 1970’s, users dissatisfied with the centralized control and expense of 
the government sponsored ARAPANET were creating alternative online discussion 
systems, three of which included features salient to current online conversations: Usenet, 
MUDs and BBS enabled virtual communities.  These systems experienced the benefits 
and deficits of large-scale, public, many-to-many interactions, and provide many 
examples of mechanisms used to structure user behavior and decrease information 
overload.  The following section describes each system and its salient features. 
Usenet 
While email discussion lists were early developments in the progress of 
ARPANET and the later Internet, it was the development of Usenet that extended online 
conversation to large-scale audiences.  Developed in 1979 by Duke University students 
Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis and University of North Carolina student Steve Bellovin, 
Usenet was initially used to exchange information about the Unix operating system 
between Duke and the University of North Carolina over telephone lines (Abbate 2000).  
Handing out written descriptions of the project as well as software tapes at conferences, 
Truscott and Ellis freely distributed the program and encouraged fellow Unix enthusiasts 
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to sign on to the endeavor (Pfaffenberger 2002).  By 1984 nearly 1,000 sites were 
participating in the network (Quarterman and Hoskins 1986).  Usenet allowed 
connections between sites with fewer resources than had been typical in the ARPANET 
system.  By lowering the barriers to entry for sites, it allowed for more organizations to 
be part of the computer network and broadened the base of computer network users.  This 
meant that non-programmers who had alternative agendas than sharing computer code 
could communicate directly with each other. 
The content of Usenet is organized into different “newsgroups” in which users 
“post” content.  A message may be cross-posted to many newsgroups and contain meta-
information that provide context in terms of the poster and related messages (Smith and 
Fiore 1991; Whittaker, Terveen et al. 1998; Fiore, Tiernan et al. 2002). 
Usenet newsgroup participation offers prototypical examples of the types of 
problems that can occur in large-scale, persistent, online interactions.  Pfaffenberger 
(Pfaffenberger 2002) describes historical examples of socialization problems that occur in 
current settings.  Trolling, spamming, flaming, flooding and other such colorful terms to 
describe user misbehavior originated in Usenet.  Newsgroups reacted to these 
misbehaviors in many different ways.  Occasionally, a newsgroup would increase 
centralized control, and introduce moderation to the interactions of that group.  
Sometimes newsgroup members would exit a group with too many misbehaving users 
and form new groups to avoid them.  Some newsgroups became inactive since the 
misbehavior was too prevalent to realize the intended activity of the group. 
Large-scale participation, which can lead to information overload, has also been a 
common occurrence on Usenet newsgroups.  In 2000, over 151 million messages were 
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logged by the Netscan project as having been posted to Usenet (Smith 2002).  A study of 
500 newsgroups found that the groups received an average of 24 messages per day 
(Whittaker, Terveen et al. 1998).  Other studies report similar instances of high traffic in 
Usenet newsgroups, linking the high rate of posting with information overload (Butler 
2001; Jones, Ravid et al. 2004). 
Management of both user misbehavior and information overload in newsgroups 
has been difficult, as Usenet administration is distributed with no central authority to 
coordinate efforts (Smith 1999).  When conflict occurs in Usenet newsgroups, or the 
perception of information overload is high, a common tactic is to splinter the community 
into more specialized groups (Fisher and Lueg 2002).  Although cross-posting of 
comments across groups with similar interest is common (Whittaker, Terveen et al. 
1998), few newsgroups individually have massive number of participants. 
Slashdot adopted the ideas of topic based conversation, threaded conversation 
structures, unmediated user interactions and large-scale interactions from Usenet.  The 
site did not adopt the decentralized structure of Usenet, which may be an effect of the 
structure of Web sites compared to Usenet protocols.  They also did not splinter the site 
when populations grew large, or groups decided they had opposing goals.  This may 
again result from how Websites operate as opposed to newsgroups.  Finally, Slashdot 
maintained more centralized authority than newsgroups typically used.  Although server 
administrators had broad powers like choosing which newsgroups to carry from Usenet, 
within the groups themselves power was equally distributed among members.  Slashdot 
created differences in power levels by incorporating the right to moderate comments, and 
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the administrators themselves kept broad abilities to regulate content and users at 
multiple levels. 
Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) 
Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) allowed for many-to-many interactions initially 
based on role-playing games.  MUDs provide early examples of user misbehavior and the 
resulting mechanisms developed to discourage such activities.  Many of the socio-
technical design mechanisms used in Slashdot were derived from the experiences 
designers of that site had with MUDs. 
Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) were first developed in the late 1970’s by two 
students named Roy Trubshaw and Richard Bartle.  Bartle had been involved with the 
then newly developed paper-based role playing game “Dungeons and Dragons” and 
wanted to extend the social interaction of that game to online gaming (King and Borland 
2003).  Being based in a table-top role playing game, the first MUD inherited 
conventions like numerical ratings to track player progress, the use of pseudonyms as 
acceptable practice, the concept of collaboratively created narratives, and the use of 
centralized authority as arbiter of conflict (“dungeonmasters” in the offline game and 
“wizards” or “gods” in the MUDs). 
The first MUD and most of those that followed it used textual descriptions of 
locations, objects and characters to create a sense of place in the online environment.  
Described as “text-based virtual realities” (Curtis and Nichols 1993), these games allow 
users to interact with the system and each other by describing their actions, using a set a 
preset commands to change the game environment.  Many MUDs use an adventure game 
format, where a player assumes a character identity and then navigates the world, killing 
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generated monsters, solving puzzles, collecting objects and sometimes fighting with other 
characters.  Other MUDs have dropped the “swords and sorcery” themes, encouraging 
social interactions and cooperation instead (Bruckman 1997).   
Like Usenet, MUDs experience a variety of social dilemmas, especially with the 
existence of anonymous and pseudonymous interactions.  As Curtis (Curtis 1992) 
describes in the social interactions on LambdaMOO “This protective anonymity also 
encourages some players to behave irresponsibly, rudely, or even obnoxiously.  We have 
had instances of severe and repeated sexual harassment, crudity, and deliberate 
offensiveness.”  Reid (Reid 1999) observed several fantasy and social MUDs, describing 
the social disturbances and subsequent reactions in each.  She concluded that social 
control in such spaces is enforced through hierarchical power systems enabled by a 
combination of technical features and social rules.  “Gods” and “Wizards” use access to 
deletion and editing mechanisms to enforce social rules in MUDs. 
MUDs remain relevant examples of how users came to a shared online space and 
needed to negotiate issues of governance and socialization.  Curtis (Curtis 1992) 
described many of the social dilemmas that rose in early text-based MUDs.  Muramatsu 
and Ackerman (Muramatsu and Ackerman 1998) describe similar patterns in another 
fantasy role-playing MUD, noting that social structures evolved to support various types 
of cooperation and conflict.  They also found that game administrators played valuable 
mediation roles in governing the game MUD being studied.  
MUDs have most often responded to issues of social control by increasing 
centralized authority (Reid 1999).  This limits the size of the group that can be brought 
together, as human moderation “gods” in MUDs cannot process large amounts of 
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interaction.  For example, current Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games 
(MMoRPGs) like World of Warcraft and Everquest offer multiple servers to not only 
handle the technical difficulties of massive participation, but the social burden of placing 
many players in the same space.  Conflicts between players are still mediated by 
“gamemasters” who have special access to the system.   
Slashdot borrowed several features developed by MUDs when designing their 
online conversation environment.  The use of numerical systems to track user progress, 
the use of pseudonyms, and the use of multiple authority roles are all part of their current 
operations.  However, Slashdot has not adopted the mechanisms of splintering as a 
response to large populations, which may be possible because the task of commenting on 
news stories requires lower effort than the more involved game tasks of MUDs. 
Bulletin Board Systems 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs) are networks in which users may call into a 
central computer and access a database that includes messages and software.  Especially 
in early instantiations, Usenet and MUDs could be considered specialized forms of BBSs.  
Unlike the Internet, BBSs are not typically connections of many networks, but rather 
centrally controlled servers.  The first BBSs were developed in the late-1970s, and 
continued in popularity through the 1990’s.  Wide adoption of internet protocol standards 
drew people away from local networking, but many companies, such as AOL and 
Compuserve, that started out as BBSs have changed into other computer network services 
(Abbate 2000).  
Because BBSs depended on modem dialing into the central computer, the 
networks remained relatively small and geographically located.  However, these 
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limitations seemed to increase the feelings of social connectedness between participants, 
leading to a sense of community among participants (Rheingold 2000).  BBSs 
demonstrated the ability of online interactions to form connections between participants.  
Positive effects like access to information and affective support were reported, as well as 
negative effects like identity deception and harassment (Horn 1998). 
The salient features that Slashdot borrowed from BBSs were direct connections 
between multiple participants, and that some amount of misbehavior was likely to result 
from such contact.  BBSs also provided examples of how users who were not necessarily 
those in control of the site could fulfill roles that helped structure the interactions.  BBSs 
did not have the scale of Slashdot, were usually hosted by one person or a small group 
allowing for more centralized control,  and were often geographically centered, which are 
key differences. 
Methods of governing online discussions 
Online interactions are hampered by the effects of information overload and user 
misbehavior, which has engendered numerous mechanisms for ameliorating those 
problems.  This section briefly describes the nature and origin of problems associated 
with Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC), and then proceeds to describe 
common methods to manage online discussions.  The goal of this narrative is to show that 
most of the mechanisms that have been developed do not adequately ease the effects of 
massive participation without losing the benefits of such participation.  
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Effects of computer mediation on communication 
 The purpose of this section is to briefly describe the characteristics of CMC that 
require the use of special mechanisms to help participants.  CMC allows for large-scale 
participation, since the technological burden of adding new participants is not high.  
Adding email addresses to a distribution list, or allowing more members in a newsgroup, 
will not significantly affect the performance of the technology that supports those media.  
This has the possible positive effect of including large groups of users and maintaining 
peripheral awareness of online communities through the capacity for low level 
participation (Resnick 2001), but also creates the possible negative effect of information 
overload.  Information overload in online communities happens when the quantity of 
available messages is higher than the ability of a consumer of the site to use those 
messages (Butler 2001).   
CMC also constrains the information we can perceive about fellow discussion 
participants.  This has possible positive effects in that it can reduce the biases often found 
in face-to-face communication, but has possible negative effects in that anonymous 
interactions seem to increase user misbehavior (Sproull and Kiesler 1991).  The need for 
richer information channels may depend on how much common ground is necessary in 
the interaction being accomplished (Olson and Olson 2001). 
Mechanisms for structuring online communication 
 As shown above, many problems with computer-mediated communication stem 
from either information overload caused by large-scale participation or degraded 
common ground caused by constrained information channels.  Methods of organizing 
online communities have focused on directly redressing one or both of those problems 
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through the addition of technological tools and/or social mechanisms.  This section will 
describe the methods that have used these techniques for structuring online communities, 
and then discuss why there are opportunities to explore alternative methods. 
Increased media channels 
 Some systems add media channels back to computer-mediated communication in 
order to increase the capacity for reaching mutual understanding between participants.  
There is a long history of systems that add media channels back into CMC environments, 
especially in the field of computer-supported cooperative work (Olson and Olson 2002).  
A review of the research in this area is beyond the scope of this narrative, but 
communication channels that have been replaced in CMC include visual, audio, gesture, 
co-referentiality, chronomics, proxemics and even the ability to touch objects (Clark 
1992).   
 These systems have been developed to support small group activity, usually 
structured around work tasks.  Adding media channels back to CMC environments 
necessarily constrains the number of participants that may use the system.  Consequently, 
media-enhanced interactions as they have been developed to this point will not support 
the large-scale interactions of interest to this work. 
Centralized editing and censoring 
In some online discussion systems, a single editor (or small group of editors) 
maintains control over a broad range of “write” permissions.  Write permissions may take 
the form of an ability to add or delete members, and edit or delete content.  This person, 
or group, is sometimes called an editor, or moderator.  In MUDs these centralized 
authority figures are called wizards, gods or game masters.  To not confuse this role with 
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the meaning of a Slashdot moderator, I will use the term “editor” to describe these users 
with strong centralized authority. 
Centralized write permission may be used to mitigate information overload by 
restricting how many new users may enter an online discussion, vetting content before it 
is distributed to an entire group or in some cases editing messages for length.  User 
misbehavior is often reduced through centralized control by censoring users, vetting 
content and or editing content for inflammatory material. 
Email lists are an example of an online communication mechanism that use 
centralize authority to structure interactions, and common list software provide 
documentation on various methods for editing, vetting, or deleting content (L-Soft 
International 2002).  A survey of list moderators found that 32% of list moderators 
described their main duties as filtering content, as opposed to 14% who responded that 
their primary duty was to prevent flaming, and 12% who listed conversation facilitation 
as the major goal of moderation (Collins and Berge 1997).  The same survey found that 
list moderators felt that reducing noise, reducing off-topic conversation and preventing 
flames were the top three reasons for moderating an email list.  Slowing down 
conversation and increased moderator effort were listed as the top two reasons for not 
moderating. 
Some Usenet newsgroups are moderated as well, with newsgroup administrators 
editing content, often for grammar and spelling according to one early survey (Morris 
1993).  The same study found that time limitations caused group moderators to restrict 
the amount of time spent editing, doing so only when clarity of the message would suffer 
otherwise. 
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Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) also typically centralize authority for editing and 
censoring content and users.  Typically referred to as “gods” or “wizards”, these super-
users typically can edit participants, delete characters from a system, or censor the actions 
of a user (Curtis and Nichols 1993).  Reid (Reid 1999) described various methods by 
which control is exerted in MUDs.  Studying both adventure and social MUDs, she found 
that users with central authority, wizards, used their control over the code of their spaces 
to resolve conflict.  However, she warned that often these interventions were seen as 
involving favoritism, and often called into question the legitimacy of the authority of the 
MUD.  When centralized authority is viewed as autocratic, it can be harmful to future 
participation in a space.  Smith (Smith 1999) described the development of complex 
mediation rules in a MUD to resolve conflict between regular users and administration. 
There are two characteristics of centralized control of online discussion spaces 
that point toward exploring other mechanisms for large scale interaction: scalability and 
protection of minority opinions. 
As a group grows in size, the number of messages becomes too large for a single 
moderator or even group of moderators to constrain.  Jones et al (Jones, Ravid et al. 
2002) describe online interaction in terms of an S-shaped curve.  Initial critical mass is 
hard to build, but once achieved leads to an explosion of contributions.  If the overload 
caused by the sudden growth becomes too difficult to sort through, conversation breaks 
down to pre-critical mass levels.  Centralized content moderation is unlikely to manage 
this explosive growth, and hence would lose the benefits that come from mass 
interaction. 
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Online discussions may include a variety of viewpoints, some of which may be 
unpopular with those with centralized authority.  One goal of a robust conversation 
environment is the ability to express minority opinions (Cristiano 1999), which may be 
difficult to foster if a central editor controls which posts are distributed.   
 Distributed editing and censoring 
Another option for guiding group behavior is to diffuse the authority to edit or 
censor to a wider group of users.  While most online spaces allow for some type of user 
contribution, granting the ability to affect other users’ contributions is rare.  These 
systems address information overload problems by distributing the editorial role over a 
larger population of participants, and manage problems of user misbehavior by allowing 
users to police content for malicious changes (Bryant, Forte et al. 2005). 
Often, spaces will allow for personal control of views, though the control is 
distributed among users as a type of customization.  For example, killfiles have been used 
in Usenet to allow users to filter out the contributions of specified newsgroup 
participants, and “ignore” commands in email and online games have been used for the 
same purpose. 
Distributing editing and censoring privileges to a wide user base is a method used 
by the site Wikipedia8.  This site is a user-generated encyclopedia built on the Wiki 
platform.  Wikipedia allows for any user to edit, delete or contribute to an entry on the 
site.  To control for malicious edits, like erasing and entire entry, the site mirrors “last, 
best copies” and enables other users to replace the broken content.  A recent analysis of 
author conflict on Wikipedia showed that most malicious edits are fixed quickly, though 
                                                 
8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page 
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sometimes contributors can become locked in a re-editing loop where each undoes the 
others’ actions (Viegas, Wattenberg et al. 2004). 
Distributing the authority to edit and censor globally in an online community 
remains rare, and may only work for certain types of endeavors.  Besides Wikipedia and 
other Wiki projects, there are few examples of truly distributed editing and censoring.  
Open source software development is sometimes seen as the prototypical example of this 
type of activity (Raymond 2000), though studies of open source projects show that 
centralized authority is relatively strong in terms of controlling membership and which 
content is distributed (Mockus, Field et al. 2002; Sandusky and Gasser 2005).   
Wikipedia has characteristics that make it particularly disposed to distributed 
editing and moderating.  Encyclopedia entries are relatively static, with no particular 
“shelf-life” for access by incoming users.  Slashdot stories, on the other hand, have 
relatively short life spans.  Discussion on news may be a quicker overall process than the 
creation of a knowledge artifact like an encyclopedia.  This means that the principles that 
seem to work in Wiki systems and similar endeavors may not translate to other types of 
online interaction.  This work adds to the literature on distributed governance of online 
communities by adding the activity of news discussion to what is known about 
distributed governance. 
Recommender and reputation systems 
The methods described above offer solutions that may not map to text-only, 
public, large-scale, relatively ephemeral interactions like those found in online discussion 
forums.  One solution that may be more applicable to such environments is the use of 
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recommender systems to leverage the past experiences of some users to inform the 
choices of current users.  This section describes the literature on recommender systems, 
including possible hurdles to their implementation in online discussions. 
Stated simply, recommender systems offer information about a choice that a 
consumer has to make between several alternative products or services when the 
consumer does not have personal experience with those alternatives.  To reduce 
uncertainty about which alternative to choose, the consumer (or user) turns to others who 
have had previous experience with the range of choices.  In short, any time the past is 
predictive of the future, recommender and reputation systems can help people make 
informed choices about what to pay attention to or consume and with whom to interact 
(Resnick and Varian 1997). 
Seeking information about a choice from people who made that choice previously 
is common in the offline environment.  Formalized systems like movie ratings, restaurant 
reviews and buying guides depend on experts to provide information about the relative 
worth of a product or service.  An example is Consumer Reports, a nonprofit organization 
founded in 1936 that tests a wide range of products on multiple criteria, and then makes 
recommendations about which to purchase to its members.  People seek 
recommendations from less formal sources like family and friends as well.  For example, 
a person deciding which movie to see might select one based on the fact that a friend saw 
it and said they enjoyed it, a tendency typically referred to as “word of mouth”. 
Online recommender systems use computation to aggregate the past experiences 
of some users to predict future preferences for other users.  Items being recommended 
can include content, products, services and other users.  Reputation systems are tools that 
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recommend other users, rather than some item of content (Resnick, Zeckhauser et al. 
2000).  Although Slashdot does use a reputation system, none of the work in this 
dissertation deals specifically with that tool.  Consequently, this section will focus 
recommender systems for content rather than people. 
Recommender systems can differ widely on how preferences are computed, and 
how preferences are collected.  The following sections describe these characteristics of 
technology-enabled recommender systems. 
Computing preferences in recommender systems 
Recommendations may be specific or general.  For example, if I recommend a 
book on Amazon, I am making a general recommendation to the public at large.  If I tell 
my friend to read a book, then I am making a specific recommendation.  As Terveen and 
Hill (Terveen and Hill 2002) say:  
“A recommendation may be directed to specific individuals or ‘broadcast’ to 
anyone who’s interested.  For the person who receives it, a recommendation is a 
resource that helps in making a choice from the universe of alternatives…  A 
recommendation may be based not just on the recommender’s preferences but also on 
those of the recommendation seeker.” 
 
 Generalized online recommender systems include a range of systems.  Amazon 
allows users to create lists of books on a certain topic, so that a user searching for a book 
on a certain topic may find a collection of similar books recommended by a person 
familiar with them.  Apple’s iTunes allows users to see the music play lists of others.  
Epinions9, a site dedicated to sharing experiences with a wide range of consumer 
products, has users provide simple ratings of items and write about their experiences on 
the site.  Even though these types of systems may use technological tools to aggregate 
                                                 
9 http://www.epinions.com/ 
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ratings or collect lists, they do not match recommendations to users through any 
computational mechanism.  Rather, users must seek out like others, or trust that a 
recommendation is globally applicable. 
Alternatively, some recommender systems use mechanisms to match 
recommendations to users based on their preferences.  These systems can match 
preferences either through content similar to what a user has shown interest in previously, 
or through users who display similar interests.  Tapestry, perhaps the earliest 
recommender system, was designed so that shared documents within Xerox PARC could 
be retrieved based on ratings and replies from those who had already read them 
(Goldberg, Nichols et al. 1992).  This project coined the term “collaborative filtering” to 
describe technologically-enabled recommendation in which recommendations are 
tailored to specific user preferences.  GroupLens (Resnick, Iacovou et al. 1994; Konstan, 
Miller et al. 1997) uses collaborative filtering to recommend articles in Usenet news.  
GroupLens operates by asking users to rate a certain number of Usenet articles as useful 
or not.  Those ratings are compared with other users rating the same content using 
statistical similarity methods.  If Person A has a rating on an item similar to Person B, 
then other items Person B rated might be of interest to Person A.  Ringo was a tool that 
allowed users to rate music with which they had experience, and then used correlation to 
match users of similar tastes and make further listening recommendations (Shardanand 
and Maes 1995).  Another well-known collaborative filtering system is MovieLens, based 
off the GroupLens project, a movie recommendation site (Herlocker, Konstan et al. 
2004).  MovieLens solicits ratings on movies that users have already seen, and uses those 
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ratings to recommend movies that the user did not rate, but that people who had assigned 
similar scores for the rated movies did.   
Eliciting preferences in recommender systems 
 As mentioned above, generalized recommender systems depend on users seeking 
out recommendations that they feel match their preferences or are general enough to 
apply to all information seekers.  Collaborative filtering, on the other hand, depends on 
knowing about the preferences of the recommendation seeker as well as the 
recommendation provider. 
 One method of eliciting user preferences is to impute future preferences based on 
their previous choices, which is sometimes referred to as “content recommendation” 
(Terveen and Hill 2002).  For example, if a user buys a Bruce Springsteen album on a 
music sale site, the system might log that information and guess that they are interested in 
other albums by the same artist.  This can be expanded by examining other purchases 
made by users who also bought a Springsteen album, and recommending those items.  
This is not collaborative filtering, in that users are not matched on similarity, but rather 
the content is the unit being matched.  There are several potential problems with this type 
of preference mining.  Content recommendation is limited in that only near term matches 
are possible, and a user will not be recommended anything dissimilar to what they have 
seen in the past (Balabanovic and Shoham 1997).  Also, matches assume single 
motivations for seeking recommendations.  For example, one might buy a jazz album 
online as a present for a friend, but not be interested in future recommendations for jazz 
albums.  Another potential issue is multiple use of single online accounts.  An Amazon 
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buyer might share and accounts with family members, and consequently have 
confounded recommendations based on the purchases of that member. 
 Another way of soliciting user preferences is to analyze implicit choices they have 
made and impute decisions from them, sometimes referred to as social data mining.  
PHOAKS10 is a system that uses search tools to find URLs in newsgroup postings, and 
recommend web pages based on a series of calculations about how and where the URL 
appears in a newsgroup (Hill and Terveen 1996).  Google uses a type of recommendation 
service as well to match search requests.  Using its PageRank software and software 
agents that comb the web, Google captures the way Web pages describe a link for future 
matching.  For example, “University of Michigan”, “UM” and “Umich” may all be labels 
that a person using Google might use while searching for the website for the University 
of Michigan.  PageRank takes those labels, and matches them to how creators of web 
pages have used matching labels to describe URLs.  If I search for “Umich” Google will 
match me to a URL that others have described with the “Umich” label.  In effect, Google 
is capturing implicit recommendations for URLs based on how different people label the 
link to those URLs (Bianchini, Gori et al. 2005).  Social data mining is a useful method in 
that it does not require additional work for users to state their preferences.  The problem 
with this method is that it only allows generalized recommendations, though key term 
searching, for example, allows users to more easily search for recommended items. 
 Many recommender systems depend on explicitly solicited user preferences to 
match users with similar interest.  MovieLens requires users to rate movies in order to 
correlate stated preferences with those of other users.  If the user does not provide their 
preferences, there is no basis to make matches with other users.  Using explicit ratings 
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resolves problems of multiple goals found in implicit data mining, but depends on 
relatively high user effort to input preferences. 
Some online recommender systems use a hybrid of preference solicitations to 
recommend content.  Netflix11, an online movie rental site, combines explicitly stated 
user preferences with rental history to compute collaborative filtering recommendations.  
Tivo uses explicit ratings in terms of their “thumbs up” and “thumbs down” tools and 
implicit ratings in terms of shows chosen to watch to make recommendations to users 
about shows they have not rated, but may enjoy (Ali and vanStam 2004). 
Inherent barriers in recommendation and reputation 
Slashdot uses a recommender system to provide information about how previous 
users valued comments after they had read them.   
For recommender systems to be effective, they must overcome a variety of 
potential inherent barriers.  Scarcity, for example, is the problem of eliciting sufficient 
feedback on items to make future recommendations  (Balabanovic and Shoham 1997; 
Avery, Resnick et al. 1999).  Users may benefit from the recommendations of others 
without subsequently enriching the system with their own recommendations.  Scarce 
ratings can occur because of small user populations, or because social loafing (Karau and 
Williams 1993), in which responsibility for action is distributed across a group leading to 
decreased participation.  Especially in recommender systems that depend on explicit 
statements of user preferences, eliciting sufficient feedback may be difficult. 
The first rating in a system can have a disproportionate effect on the direction of 
future ratings.  This tendency is referred to as “herding” (Banerjee 1992), or information 
                                                 
11 http://www.netflix.com/ 
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cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1989; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1998).  
An example of this tendency in the psychology literature is to the tendency of pedestrians 
to look up when they see someone else doing so (McPhail 1991).  This can be 
problematic for online rating systems in that content may be incorrectly scored because 
of earlier ratings.  There was an indication of this found in MovieLens ratings, where 
users ratings were affected differently by being shown different scores from previous 
users (Cosley, Lam et al. 2003). 
Users also need to trust and understand the recommendation being provided. 
Users may not trust recommendations that do not reflect their experience.  For example if 
they are recommended a movie they did not like, they may lose overall trust in the 
system.  Users have shown a preference to have how their preferences were computed 
explained in the display of results (Herlocker, Konstan et al. 2000).  One technique for 
adding feedback about the correctness of ratings has been the use of meta-rating 
techniques, in which the accuracy of an inferred preference is itself rated (Schafer, 
Konstan et al. 2002).  There may be a difference in the provision of ratings when the 
ratings themselves are made publicly or privately (Dellarocas 2003).  Ratings made 
privately may be trusted less than those publicly tied to another user, as consumers of the 
rating would have more context in the latter condition for determining the motivations of 
the rater. 
Use of recommender systems in online conversation 
Recommender systems may be useful for structuring online conversations.  These 
systems disperse the work load of identifying valuable content among many users, 
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allowing for scalability.  Recommender systems may support minority opinions by 
identifying clusters of users who have shared perspectives.  By allowing for filtering 
based on user preferences, online conversation rating systems offer tools for resolving 
information overload without constraining membership.  Although Tapestry and 
GroupLens are both examples of the application of recommender systems to online 
conversations, neither was widely used.  The Slashdot case operates on a larger scale than 
either previous example.  This scale, as well as the long time use of the Slashdot 
recommender, makes this an interesting case to extend the literature on recommender 
systems. 
Conclusion 
 The goal of this narrative was to show that online conversations have traditionally 
faced a similar set of problems, the solutions for which have been sub-optimal for 
encouraging large-scale, public interactions.  Recommender systems offer a toolset that 
might help resolve some of the tensions between managing large-scale online interactions 
without losing the benefits of that scale.  Slashdot provides an interesting “in the wild” 
example of a recommender system used in online interactions. 
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Chapter 3                                                               
Follow the Reader: Filtering Comments on Slashdot12 
 
Abstract 
Large-scale online communities need to manage the tension between critical mass 
and information overload.  Slashdot is a news and discussion site that has used comment 
rating to allow massive participation while providing a mechanism for users to filter 
content.  We find that many users are actively using ratings to restructure how comments 
are shown to them.  However, many users are not using ratings to guide their reading 
behavior, which may be caused by friction: the perceived cost of changing a setting 
versus the perceived benefit for having done so.  We recommend leveraging the efforts of 
the users that do use the rating system to reduce the cost of changing for all other users. 
One strategy is the creation of statistically motivated schemas that represent types of 
reading behavior. Another strategy is to dynamically set filtering thresholds for 
comments, based in part on the choices of previous readers, which are far better 
predictors of readers’ choices than content features such as the number of comments or 
the ratings of those comments. 
                                                 
12 Work done with Erik Johnston and Paul Resnick, pending submission. 
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Introduction 
Massive, many-to-many online discussions may have a range of benefits, 
including information sharing(Ackerman, Swenson et al. 2003), the creation of new 
forms of social capital (Resnick 2001), scientific discovery (Finholt and Olson 1997) and 
political discourse (Kelly, Fisher et al. 2005).  However, users may never realize these 
positive outcomes if worthwhile content is buried in the rush of messages typical in 
online discussions involving hundreds or thousands of participants.  Information overload 
occurs when an individual is unable to process or use all of the available inputs.  Early 
research in psychology showed that humans have a limited cognitive capacity to accept 
new information (Miller 1956).  This limitation is exacerbated in CMC settings where 
technology allows large numbers of participants in online discussions. 
Jones et al. (Jones, Ravid et al. 2002)  examined Usenet newsgroups and found 
that users are more likely to respond to simpler messages in situations of overload; that 
users will end participation as overload increases and that users generate simpler 
responses as overload increases.  Jones and Rafaeli (Jones, Ravid et al. 2004) also found 
that in larger Usenet newsgroups, as measured by number of postings to the group, 
messages became shorter.  Previously, Jones and Rafaeli (Jones and Rafaeli 1999) 
proposed that communication online takes an S-shaped pattern of frequency of 
occurrence.  Early in the existence of a conversation space, or “virtual public” to use their 
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term, there is a struggle to achieve critical mass of people contributing to the 
conversation.  A sharp increase after that critical mass is achieved results in information 
overload, and communication levels off as participants are dis-incentivized by the rate of 
messages.  Jones and Rafaeli (Jones, Ravid et al. 2004) have described this as a tension 
between the critical mass needed to benefit from “shared public online interpersonal 
interactions” and the breakdowns that occur in information overload conditions.  Butler 
(Butler 2001) found that large listservs lost a higher proportion of their users to attrition 
than smaller groups.  If there are too few interactions, users may decide they do not have 
much to gain from participating themselves in that group.  If there are too many 
interactions, users may become dissatisfied with the amount of “noise” in the group and 
seek less active groups. 
Several strategies have been employed to help readers make sense of complex 
online environments.  Netscan provides statistics and visualizations about Usenet 
participation, helping to illustrate newsgroup interaction dimensions and styles (Smith 
2002).  Visualizations have also been used to provide context to email discussions (Fisher 
2004), Wikipedia interactions (Viegas, Wattenberg et al. 2004) and cross-linking in blogs 
and personal Web pages (Adamic and Glance 2005).  Ackerman (Ackerman, Swenson et 
al. 2003) has used a combination of software agents, social rules and automatic text 
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summarization to “distill” comments from an online discussion forum into discrete 
discussion summaries.   
Rating systems have been used widely to provide information about people, 
products and content online (Terveen and Hill 2002).  An early attempt to apply ratings to 
online messages was the Tapestry (Goldberg, Nichols et al. 1992) system, which had 
users rate content in an intranet messaging site, and then made recommendations for new 
articles based on collaborative filtering strategies.  GroupLens (Resnick, Iacovou et al. 
1994) applied this idea to Usenet and introduced  the technique of automated, 
personalized recommendations based on the ratings of people with similar tastes, a 
technique that is now commonly referred to as collaborative filtering or recommender 
systems. GroupLens displayed its predictions of user interest in a message as a guide, but 
did not automatically use the predictions to sort or filter messages. 
As described more fully in Chapter 2, Slashdot collects ratings from selected 
readers who act in a “moderator” role. Moderators assign labels such as “Informative”, 
“Funny”, or “Troll” to comments. Based on those labels, each comment accumulates a 
score from -1 to +5.  Slashdot not only displays the score of each message, but also 
allows users to sort or filter the available messages based on those scores.  
Here, we examine the impact of ratings on readers. First, we look for evidence 
about whether users prefer that ratings be used to sort or filter their messages. Then, we 
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suggest new features that could be introduced, to make the ratings more useful to more 
readers. Evidence about users’ preferences comes both from responses to subjective 
survey questions, and from objective measures of users’ choices of setting when reading 
comments.   
Figure 3.1:  Options for changing comments settings temporarily within discussion 
forums. 
 
Literature on user access of customization features indicates that few people take 
advantage of advanced interface options.  Mackay (Mackay 1991) conducted interviews 
with and collected automatic records of customization activities of 51 members of a 
project at MIT over a four month period.  She found that users engaged in a continual 
analysis of the cost of learning to customize versus the benefit of having done so.  A 
significant barrier includes the lack of time to learn the specific tools available.  Triggers 
for changing preferences included when changing allowed the user to avoid learning new 
behaviors.  Customizing to make an environment more aesthetically pleasing was 
generally avoided.  Mackay concluded that users “satisfice” rather than optimize, that is 
they do the minimum necessary to use the software. 
Page et al. (Page, Johnsgard et al. 1996) studied 101 users of a text-editing 
program and found that 92% of participants did some form of customization.  They also 
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found a strong relationship between how much the software was used and the amount of 
customization that took place.  The more the system was used, the more customization 
users engaged in.  This research suggests that users only change options when absolutely 
necessary, for instance when their work is being seriously impeded, or they are heavy 
users and find certain repetitive tasks easier to customize.  Mackay mentions satisficing 
as a possible explanation for this behavior.  Satisficing is a term from Simon (Simon 
1996), and relates to the bounded capacity for humans to make rational decisions.  
Cognitively, people are unable to hold all the variables necessary for making a choice in 
mind, so they instead choose a “good enough” solution.  March and Simon (March and 
Simon 1958) argue that only in rare occasions are people concerned with the optimal 
solution, and that people compare the marginal-benefit of making a decision with the cost 
of that decision in terms of risk. 
Consequently, we must be circumspect in making inferences about the 
preferences of readers who have not made changes to the default settings. Our approach 
is to focus on lead users, those who have made explicit choices about their viewing 
settings. We extrapolate from the revealed preferences of those lead users to infer what 
other, less proactive users, might like the system to do, if there were no friction 
preventing them changing how they view comments.  
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Viewing Slashdot comments 
The default view for comments in a Slashdot forum is a threaded structure with a 
filtering “threshold” of +1.  Responses are indented and responses to responses are 
further indented. The responses to any comment or listed in chronological order, with the 
oldest ones first. At the top level, the direct responses to an initial news story, full text is 
shown for comments that have a score of 1 or higher.  For comments deeper in the thread 
(i.e., replies to other comments), full text is shown for comments rated 4 or higher, a 
single line is shown for comments rated 1-3, and the comment is omitted if its score is 
below the threshold of 1.  
Any reader, anonymous or registered, can make a one-time change to the display 
of comments for the current story, using the options shown at the top of Figure 3.1.  
Clicking on any of the links titled “n replies below your current threshold” will set the 
threshold to -1.   Through pull-down menus shown at the top of Figure3.1, a reader can 
set the threshold to any value between -1 and +5.  A reader can also sort messages based 
on their ratings; at each level of the response hierarchy messages with the highest scores 
are displayed first, rather than those that were posted first. 
In addition to one-time changes on a per-story basis, registered users may also 
make permanent changes in their personal profile.  Any of the settings that can be elected 
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on a one-time basis can be set as the user’s standard setting, the starting setting when 
reading comments about any new story.  
Registered users can also make other changes in the personal profiles that are not 
available as one-time changes. Options here include special penalties or bonuses based on 
such things as length of the comment, the reason given for moderation and whether the 
user is anonymous, or registered with high karma, which is described in Chapter 2 as the 
reputation score registered users have on the site.  These settings generate personalized 
scores for comments. A comment moderated as “Funny” may end up with a score of +3 
for one user, who has given additional bonus points to funny messages, but as -1 for 
another user who has assigned a penalty to comments rated as “funny”. In total, there are 
36 options that registered users can check to change their viewing patterns.  Figure 3.2 
shows the interface used to change these settings. 
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Figure 3.2:  Interface for changing reading preferences in a user’s profile. 
 
The way that a reader arrives at a page can affect the initial display settings, in 
particular the threshold level. As shown in Figure 3.3, each story on the index page is 
associated with several links. Following the “Read More” link will take a reader to the 
comments page with the user’s standard threshold from their profile (or the default of +1 
if the reader is not logged in). Clicking “X” in “X of Y comments” does the same thing; 
X is the number of comments that are at or above the threshold that will be set.  If a 
reader clicks on the “Y” in “X of Y comments”, the threshold is set to -1 when the page 
of comments is displayed. 
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Figure 3.3: Links to access story comments. 
 
Methods 
Slashdot server logs were analyzed to determine patterns of customization and 
reading behavior of site members.  The first log is a pre-existing Slashdot database used 
to track user profile settings.  This log includes moderation modifiers, viewing 
preferences, and other variables that affect how comments are displayed.  The second 
server log is a general user information table that records user history like account 
creation date, reputation level, comments made and similar items.  The third log tracks 
user requests for pages from the site.  This log contains time stamps of user page 
requests, user identification numbers, the URL of the page requested and whether any 
interface changes were the result of a specific user selection.  Slashdot has previously 
only logged aggregate number of page requests, and this log added the capacity to tell for 
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each user which page was being requested.  The page request log represents an 80 hour 
period in mid-July, 2005. 
The two user preference logs contain information for the 875,573 users who had 
created accounts on Slashdot.  Of those users, 90,273 logged in and requested a total of 
2,416,331 pages.  Slashdot pages are divided into several sections, only some of which 
display user comments.  Of the number of page requests listed above, 47% were for 
pages that would display user comments.  Additionally, 2,613,181 anonymous page 
requests from 409,932 IP addresses were also logged.  Given the nature of IP 
information, it is not possible to claim that each IP corresponds to one user, but it can 
give a rough estimate of the pattern of use, as argued in a recent survey article on mining 
Web logs for usage patterns (Facca and Lanzi 2005).  Of these page requests, 2,341,628 
were for pages that would display user comments.  For anonymous users, the index page 
that is a gateway into the site is most often displayed as a static page.  An artifact of the 
logging procedure was that these static page requests were not logged, so that the pages 
with user comments are a smaller portion of overall anonymous user hits than represented 
here.  All requests for pages with user comments are dynamic, and thus recorded here.  
We also conducted a survey with registered Slashdot users to learn more about 
their characteristics and attitudes.  The sampling frame for this survey was the list of 
registered Slashdot users, based on the Slashdot assigned unique identifying number.  
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User identification numbers were compared against IP addresses to assure that multiple 
numbers were not held by single individuals.  Each day a script chose 10% of the 
registered Slashdot users to receive an invitation to participate in the survey.  Potential 
respondents received an invitation to participate at the top of the index page of the site, an 
area commonly reserved for site messages, including notification to moderate and meta-
moderate.   
Between June 15 and June 20, 2005, 8121 respondents participated in the study.  
The overall response rate for the study period was 19.1%, with some variation per day.  
The survey responses may be suspect for several reasons. First, there may be non-
response bias: the people choosing to respond may be those most aware of and most 
favorably disposed to the Slashdot moderation systems. Second, the instrument may not 
be eliciting responses to the phenomenon to of interest here.  For example, readers may 
think the ratings are helpful simply because they create feedback to writers and incentives 
for them to post better comments, even if they do not use them for sorting or filtering 
when reading.  These potential problems with the survey are not extraordinary for 
surveys in general, and there is no secondary evidence to indicate that the responses are 
indeed unrepresentative of Slashdot as a whole.  Appendix 1 contains the instrument used 
for this survey. 
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Slashdot survey respondents showed many shared characteristics.  Respondents 
were 98% male, and 62% had completed a college or graduate degree.  71% of users 
were between 18 and 34 years old.  Slashdot users also reported high levels of technology 
use.  84.5% of respondents reported visiting 2 or more news and discussion sites besides 
Slashdot each day.  13.5% reported visiting 6 or more news and discussion sites per day.  
On a scale of 1-7 where 7 indicates “Extremely” when asked about how expert they 
consider themselves with computers, Slashdot respondents rated themselves an average 
of 6, with 24% of respondents placing themselves in the highest category of computer 
expertise.   
Ratings are useful to readers 
The survey asked users to indicate the extent to which they felt Slashdot’s 
moderation system was important in identifying good comments, and the response was 
generally favorable. 84.7% of respondents agreed somewhat or strongly with the 
statement “The moderation system is important in identifying good comments.” Only 
8.5% disagreed somewhat or strongly.  
The choices readers make about how comments are displayed provide a 
behavioral measure of their reaction to the views where comments are sorted or filtered 
based on the comments’ scores.   If a reader never strays from the default filtering 
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threshold, we can not infer whether he prefers that setting over all the others, or whether 
he simply has not explored the other options13. On the other hand, there are a number of 
explicit choices that users can make that reveal a preference for an alternative view that 
also uses scores to filter or sort the messages, or for an alternative view that does not use 
scores in that way. In this section, we consider what fraction of the users reveal a 
preference for a view of comments that does or not make use of the scores.  
Table 3.1 shows how frequently users make changes to either employ ratings in 
customizing how comments are displayed, or take steps to suppress the role of comment 
scores as shown by logs of user settings.  Users may occupy more than one state, so 
percentages in the table are not cumulative.  The grayed area represents settings changes 
a user makes to employ ratings to customize their view.  The cells in white are settings 
that suppress comment scores. 
Table 3.1: Percentages of users who used ratings to change their views, or made changes 
to suppress ratings.  Categories are not mutually exclusive. 
User action N Percent 
Permanently change threshold to 2-5 26,349 30.2%
Permanently change sort order to 
“Highest first” 14,132 16.2%
Temporary change threshold to 0-5 5,944 6.8%
Temporary change sort order to 
“Highest first” 927 1.1%
Change moderation label values 13,803 15.8%
Permanent change threshold to -1, no 
sort 5,209 6.0%
Temporary change thresholds to -1 1,572 1.7%
                                                 
13 For grammatical convenience, we refer to Slashdot readers generically as male. Of survey respondents, 
98% were male, suggesting that the alternative we often adopt, of making generic users female, would be 
misleading in this case. 
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with forum dropdowns 
Temporary change thresholds to -1 
through navigation 12,473 14.3%
 
 To acquire an understanding of how different categories of users are employing 
ratings differently to customize how they see comments, we divide users into three 
groups: those that never strayed from their default setting, those that explicitly chose 
score-based views and those who customize comment views to suppress the role of 
comment scores.  
Readers Who Leave Defaults Intact 
Users can change their viewing settings either permanently via their user profiles, 
or on a one-time basis. Originally, the default threshold for Slashdot comments was 0.  At 
an unrecorded time in 2000, the default threshold was changed to +1.  45.4% of users 
who logged in during the study period had their permanent viewing threshold set to either  
0 or +1 and had not changed any of the other settings in their user profile that related to 
moderation score.  In particular, they did not specify sorting based on scores, and did not 
change the score bonuses associated with labels such as funny, troll, or interesting. 
Of these users who had not changed their permanent settings in their profiles, 95% also 
did not make any one-time changes to the threshold or sort order.  This means that 43.1% 
of the total number of registered users who viewed comments during the study period 
made neither temporary nor permanent changes to how they view comments, and we are 
not able to infer whether they liked having comments filtered based on their scores.  
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Readers Who Choose Sorting or Filtering 
Of registered users who logged in during our study period, 39.2% had set their 
permanent profiles to include either a threshold of 2 or higher, or sorting based on highest 
scores first, or both.  An additional 14.6% made changes to the bonus scores assigned to 
particular comment labels, and maintained a threshold higher than -1 in their permanent 
profiles. An additional 1.4% of users did not make such permanent changes, but at least 
once made a one-time change to select a view threshold other than -1 or sorting based on 
scores. Overall, 48.3% of users made explicit choices in at least one of these three ways 
to use comment scores to affect their view. 
Readers Who Suppress Use of Scores 
The only viewing settings that suppress the use of comment scores are a filtering 
threshold of -1, and a sort order based on chronology rather than scores. We have already 
seen that some users made no changes to their view settings, and some made permanent 
or one-time changes to settings that made use of comment scores. This group of score 
suppressors includes 5.7% of the user population who set their permanent profile to have 
a threshold of -1 and no sorting based on scores, and never made a one-time change to a 
setting that used scores. The score suppressors also includes 0.003% of the user 
population who had not changed their permanent profiles and whose only one-time 
changes were to set the filtering threshold to -1.  As mentioned above, users can 
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temporarily change their thresholds to -1 by navigating the user interface, specifically by 
selecting the option “N comments below your threshold”.  We found that 14.3% of users 
made at least one change to a -1 threshold through navigation rather than through the 
drop-down menus.  Of all registered users who visited the site during the study period, 
3.8% navigated to -1, but made no other changes to either permanent or temporary 
settings.  By including those users who navigate to -1 rather than choosing it, we find that 
15% of the users had acted to suppress scores at least once. 
Summary 
We have divided users into three groups: 45.4% who never strayed from the 
default setting; 48.3% who explicitly chose score-based views, and 15.0% who were 
score suppressors, with some overlap between groups. The ratio of score-choosers to 
score suppressors, 3.2:1, is an estimate of the portion of Slashdot users who like using 
scores as a reading aid at least some of the time. 
The estimate is conservative for three reasons. First, users who never strayed from 
the default, and thus never expressed a preference, were actually employing a filtered 
view, with a threshold of 1 or 0. Many of them probably did prefer their settings over 
other available settings, but because they had not had to explicitly choose those settings, 
we count them as having indeterminate preferences. 
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Second, we included as score suppressors people who had not suppressed the use 
of scores in their permanent profiles but had suppressed scores on a one-time basis. Many 
of them may actually prefer as a general rule to have a filter threshold, and only 
sometimes suppress its use. In our conservative interpretation, however, we count these 
users as score suppressors, since they never made an active decision to rely on scores, 
and they sometimes made an active decision to suppress them. 
Third, even for users who use ratings for filtering sorting, ratings might be 
playing a role in their viewing behavior. Scores are still displayed at the top of each 
message, and they may be scrolling and “berry picking” to select highly rated comments 
from the forum.  
The 3.2:1 ratio means that, of registered users whose behavior showed a 
preference one way or the other, over three quarters preferred, at least some of the time, a 
reading view based on comment scores. This estimate is consistent with the high 
percentage of users who gave favorable responses on the survey. We conclude that 
moderation scores are, indeed, useful to most Slashdot readers, though a minority prefer 
not to use them. 
 These patterns lend some support to the idea that ratings are being used to change 
how comments are displayed, and that users seem to be employing ratings to explore the 
offerings at either end of the spectrum.  Another possible implication of these patterns is 
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that Slashdot readers are using ratings to view comments with different purposes.  
Readers who start out at +5 and maintain a high threshold might be readers with little 
time and want to get the core arguments in the thread.  Users who opt to go to -1 may 
have more time to explore.  Looking at the average threshold that a user chooses, 15.3% 
of users always change their temporary threshold to -1 and 11.4% always change their 
threshold to +5.  It could be that the viewing population can be divided into groups of 
“explorers” and “exploiters”.  Later sections will address how to identify the 
characteristics of different ratings use types. 
Friction occurs on the site 
“Friction” is a shorthand term for the factors that prevent a user from using the 
site interface to change how comments are displayed.  When viewing a forum, how 
comments are displayed may be sub-optimal, as in too many comments, or not ordered in 
a sensible way.  The best strategy for the user might be to change the viewing threshold 
or sort order, yet the cost of doing so might be higher than the expected benefit from the 
change.  Each choice presents a cognitive burden; each mouse click takes time, and each 
page reload involves a wait and then a redisplay that may destroy the user’s reading 
context. 
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Are these forms of friction preventing Slashdot from changing to more preferred 
settings, especially making one-time changes? Here again, when people take no action we 
can’t tell what their preferences are. However, we can again make some inferences based 
on the patterns of changes made by those who do make changes. 
First, of registered users who visited the site during the study period, we found 
that 10% made at least one temporary change to how comments are displayed.  Of these 
users who make temporary changes, we found that they tend to make changes relatively 
often.  We computed the ratio of stories where users change the threshold over total 
stories they viewed.  This ratio excludes the first change that the user makes in order to 
account for the use of a threshold change as a selection factor in identifying users.  For 
users who made at least one change, and viewed more than one story, on average they 
changed settings on 32% of the stories they read.   Half of the users changed settings on 
22% or more of stories they read, and a quarter of users changed settings on 60% or more 
of stories they read. 
Second, we find that readers who make one-time changes to filtering thresholds 
tend to make big jumps, not move to adjacent thresholds. Figure 3.4 below shows the 
pattern of changes from different thresholds for registered users.  The shaded boxes are 
the starting level, with the numbers next to them representing their proportion of all 
threshold levels set by registered users.  All anonymous users start with a default 
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threshold of +1; their changes in threshold are recorded separately from registered users, 
in bold italics under the registered user score for that threshold level.  These numbers 
reflect only the first change on the first story that a user reads.  This is done to account for 
multiple changes within story that would cloud the pattern of threshold changes. 
Figure 3.4: Diagram of temporary threshold changes from default thresholds. n=6152. 
 
As shown in Figure 3.4, the most common moves are to high thresholds of 3 or 
greater. The other extreme, -1, is also somewhat popular, but the middle values of 0-2 are 
less popular. Most importantly, for all starting thresholds, moves to thresholds adjacent to 
the starting threshold are less frequent than moves of two or more places. 
The patterns of big jumps suggests that there is significant friction from clicking, 
waiting for a page reload, and then getting reoriented after that reload. It seems natural to 
think that, for any user the distribution over stories of optimal filtering threshold would 
75 
be a smooth, single-peaked distribution. That is, if n is the peak, the threshold that is most 
frequently the optimal one of the reader, then n-1 and n+1 should be optimal more often 
than n-2 and n+2.  
Without any friction, then, we would expect that the most frequent changes would 
be to adjacent thresholds. With friction, however, when the adjacent thresholds are the 
optimal ones, they may not be sufficiently better than the default threshold, and the user 
would not bother to change to them. Only when a threshold farther away is optimal 
would it be sufficiently better than the default to overcome the friction. The pattern of 
actual threshold changes is consistent with this explanation. 
Reducing friction 
New system features may be able to reduce the friction that keeps users from 
finding their optimal settings. One idea is to identify useful schemas for score bonuses 
that users could select either for the permanent profiles or on a one-time basis. Another 
idea is to automatically change filtering thresholds. We consider each in turn. 
Schema Based Score Bonuses 
When moderators on Slashdot rate a comment, they are actually assigning a label 
that moves the comment’s score up or down based on the value of the label.  Registered 
users have the option to assign additional weights in either direction to the effect any 
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given label has on the score of a comment.  Table 3.2 shows the labels associated with 
comment ratings, the typical value attached to the label, and the percentages of users who 
have added weight to the comments in either direction.  This table acts as a distribution of 
the direction of weights applied to moderation labels.   
Table 3.2: Percentage of moderation label changes of those users who have changed at 
least one label setting. 
Label Frequency Percent 
Up 1515 5.4 Flamebait 
(-1) Down 11497 40.7 
Up 12713 45.0 Funny 
(+1) Down 5413 19.2 
Up 12451 44.1 Informative
(+1) Down 262 0.9 
Up 13074 46.3 Insightful 
(+1) Down 365 1.3 
Up 11144 39.5 Interesting 
(+1) Down 253 0.9 
Up 1051 3.7 Offtopic 
(-1) Down 9455 33.5 
Up 677 2.6 Redundant 
(-1) Down 10229 36.2 
Up 1270 4.5 Troll 
(-1) Down 12718 45.0 
 
Just 3.2% of registered users have personalized the score bonuses assigned to 
moderation labels. When users do change score bonuses, however, they tend to change 
more than one: 32.6% changed only one; the median was three; 13.6% changed all eight.  
A noticeable minority, about 5% of registered users, apply positive bonuses to 
moderation labels like “Troll” and “Flamebait”, essentially guaranteeing they will view 
material the system is largely designed to demote. Compared to other users, those who 
had applied positive weight to negative labels had higher average moderations spent (54 
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vs. 49; t=-2.67, p<.01), higher karma (12.8 vs. 10.6; t=-8.82, p<.01) and had made more 
comments (179 vs. 67; t=-26.64, p<.01).  This is counter-intuitive, as one would expect 
users less entrenched in Slashdot to be the ones who might want to see such content.  One 
explanation might be that experienced users enjoy the entertainment value of comments 
that are rated negatively, “living in the muck” as it were. 
If changes to score bonuses based on labels occurs in clusters of changes, it might 
be possible to find patterns of weights that indicate types of use. For example, people 
who added positive bonuses to the “Interesting” label may be more likely also give a 
positive bonus to “Insightful” than to “Funny.” This suggests that users might find it 
helpful to be able to choose, with a single click, a schema that identifies a cluster of 
settings for score bonuses. We identify several possible schemas: gem seekers, serious 
thinkers, muck rakers, and humor seekers. 
Grouping of moderation labels 
To detect sensible schemas based on moderation labels, we grouped the most 
common changes in label values that users made.  Some users are reinforcing the rating 
directions of the moderation labels by assigning additional weights to positively connoted 
labels.  One possible schema related to this tendency might be a grouping for “Gem 
Seeker” users who further reinforce rating directions tied to labels to constrain the 
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comments to only those that are seen as most cogent.   To see if this pattern currently 
exists, we looked at those users who added weight to the “Interesting” label to see which 
other label modifications occur concurrently.  Table 3.3 shows the number of people who 
had added weight to the “Interesting” label who also weighted ratings for other labels 
either negatively and positively.  The percentage column indicates what percentage of the 
number who weighted “Interesting” positively that represented.  Overall, 11,144 users 
added positive weight to the “Interesting” label.   
Table 3.3:  Percent of users who change label values up or down who have also modified 
“Interesting” comment with higher ratings. 
 n % in 
“Interesting” 
Informative (up) 9,889 88.7 
Insightful (up) 10,080 90.5 
Funny (Up) 7,363 66.1 
Funny (down) 1,133 10.2 
Off-topic (down) 5,852 52.5 
Troll (down) 7,120 63.9 
Flamebait (down) 6,803 61.0 
 
For users who added weight to the “Insightful” label, we found that they were 
very likely to also add ratings value to “Informative” and “Insightful”.  Conversely, they 
also tended to further decrease the rating values associated with negative labels.  These 
users are elevating weights in the rating system to create a schema whereby highly rated 
and lower rated comments are winnowed dramatically.  This shows that some users have 
already customized a “Gem Seeker” view that could possibly be of use to future readers. 
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As shown above, some users assigned positive ratings to typically negative labels like 
“Troll” and “Flamebait”.  It could be that these users are setting a cluster of modified 
labels that bring poorly rated comments to light.  A schema for “Muck Rakers” might be 
of use to those who find entertainment value in the personal insults and deceptions that 
constitute “Troll” and “Flamebait” comments.  A total of 1270 users modified the “Troll” 
moderation tag to increase the score of comments that received that label.  Table 3.4 
shows what those users who modified “Troll” as positive did with other labels. 
Table 3.4: Percent of users who change label values up or down who have also modified 
“Troll” comments with higher ratings. 
 n % in “Troll” 
Flamebait (up) 802 63.1 
Off-topic (up) 469 36.9 
Funny (Up) 484 38.1 
Funny (down) 190 15.0 
Interesting (down) 83 6.5 
Insightful (down) 74 5.8 
Informative (down) 74 4.5 
 
This pattern is slightly different than that found in the “Gem Seeker” schema.  
While “Muck Rakers” do seem to promote comments with negative labels, they also are 
not widely demoting comments with positive labels.  In fact, for users who modified the 
“Troll” label positively, they more frequently added, rather than subtracted, additional 
weight to the positive labels.  This describes a schema where users are not wanting to see 
only negative comments, but do want to pull them up below the default thresholds to 
increase the chance of viewing them along with the positively labeled comments. 
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Grouping “Serious Thinkers” and “Humor Seekers” seems largely to depend on 
how users react to the Funny label.  Around 10% of users who rate up Interesting, 
Insightful and Informative took the additional step of rating Funny down.  There seems to 
be at least one grouping of users who prefer to view only those comments that other users 
have not labeled as funny.  On the other hand another group of users who rate Funny 
highly also increase the ratings for other labels including Informative, Troll and 
Insightful.  These users seem to want to read comments labeled as Funny, despite their 
other actions with different labels. 
This data supports a view of Slashdot users with heterogeneous goals in reading 
comments who use the label weighting system to enact those goals.  Users without the 
ability to similarly customize, either because they are anonymous users without the 
option or high-friction registered users, may benefit from viewing schemas based on 
those users who do create custom ratings. 
Automatic Threshold Changes 
Given the apparent friction, that users who would prefer other settings will not 
necessarily select them, there are opportunities for the system to assist in those selections. 
For example, based on the pattern of one-time changes a user makes, the system could 
offer to make changes in the user’s permanent profile. 
Here we focus on automatic threshold changes, where the system infers, for a 
particular story, that a user would be likely to prefer a different setting. Given the costs 
involved in manual changes to settings, we have limited information about whether, for 
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particular stories, users would have preferred different threshold levels than the ones they 
actually used. 
However, we can get some indicator about what kinds of stories would benefit 
from one-time increases in filter thresholds by examining the behavior of lead users, 
those who seem to have less friction in making one-time changes. We examine the 
behavior of users who read at least five stories during our study period, and made at least 
one one-time increase in their filtering threshold. There were 884 such users; they read a 
total of 428 stories during the study period, and increased their threshold while reading 
23% of them. 
We constructed a logistic regression model to predict when our lead users decided 
to make one-time increases in their filter thresholds. Several factors enter the equation as 
independent variables. First, of course, is the default threshold set in each user’s profile: 
as Figure 4 showed, threshold increases were far more likely from a +1 threshold than at 
+4 threshold (an increase is not possible from a +5 threshold). The second factor is the 
total number of comments that had been written about a story at the time the user read 
that story and its associated comments. The third factor is the quality of those comments, 
as measured by the percentage that achieved scores of 3 or higher. 
Analogous to collaborative filtering, where the opinions or behavior of other 
people leads to recommendations about items to attend to, the threshold choices of other 
users can be mined to predict when users increase thresholds: if many past readers 
increased their thresholds, the current reader may be more likely to as well. To 
operationalize this variable, for each reading of a story we computed the percentage of 
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previous reads of that story by other lead users where the users increased their filtering 
thresholds. 
Table 3.5 shows results of estimating the binary logistic (logit) regression model. 
The base result is for users with a permanent threshold of -1. When interpreting a logit 
model, positive coefficients indicate higher probabilities with the amount of the coefficient 
indicating how strongly that variable affects the probability of the event occurring.  P-
values with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant at the .05 alpha level or better. 
Table 3.5: Logistic regression predicting that a lead user will increase their comment 
threshold. 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 
n 26,335 
 Coef. Z P>|z| 
Default thresh = 0  0.164 2.78 .005* 
Default thresh= 1 0.251 4.52 .001* 
Default thresh= 2 -0.063 -1.04 .296 
Default thresh= 3 -0.778 -13.42 .001* 
Default thresh= 4 -1.251 -15.59 .001* 
Number of comments at time of 
view -0.001 -5.11 .001* 
Percent of comments in forum at 
score 3 or higher -0.700 -4.19 .001* 
Percent of lead users who already 
viewed that change 5.714 48.68 .001* 
Constant -1.962 -28.18 .001* 
 
Users with thresholds set at 0 or +1 in their permanent profiles were more likely to 
make a one-time increase in the filtering threshold than those with a permanent threshold of 
-1. This makes sense since presumably those who have permanent thresholds of -1, which 
turns off filtering, are less likely to want to turn it on. On the other hand, those with 
permanent thresholds of 3 or 4 were less likely to make one-time increases. They have 
relatively little to gain from increasing thresholds from their already high levels. 
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If users were merely trying to read a manageable number of comments for each 
story, we expect them to raise their filtering thresholds when there were more comments 
above their threshold. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not the case: both more comments and 
a higher percentage of comments getting scores above 2 led to decreases in the probability 
that users would increase their threshold.  In the case of number of comments, a coefficient 
of -0.001 indicated a very slight effect on the final probability.  
While statistically significant, the level of impact of the total number of comments 
is small. For a lead user with initial threshold of +1, reading a story with the median 
number of comments (181), with the median percentage of highly rated comments (30), 
and the median percentage of previous lead users increasing their thresholds (15%), the 
predicted probability of this user increasing his threshold while reading the story is 46%. If, 
instead, there were 350 comments (the 75th percentile), the probability of increasing his 
threshold would decrease to only 44%. The impact of the percentage of highly rated 
messages is also comparably small. If that percentage increases to 22% (the 75th 
percentile), the predicted probably only makes a slight further decline, to 43%. 
On the other hand, the behavior of prior users is both statistically and practically 
significant. If the percentage of prior users who increased their threshold moves from 30% 
to 42% (the 75th percentile), the predicted probability jumps all the way to 60%. This large 
impact suggests that a collaborative filtering style interface, where the threshold decisions 
of early readers affects the automatically selected thresholds of later readers could be quite 
effective.  It is not that users choosing a threshold observe the actions of lead users, but 
rather that the lead users predict what others will do. 
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It may be that the actions of prior users already take into account the number of 
comments and the percentage of them that were of high quality. Thus, in the regression 
model, there would not be any additional effect attributed to those factors. This can not 
explain the negative coefficients, however.  One explanation may be that more comments 
and more highly rated comments are indicators of better conversations, and readers 
increase thresholds only for lower quality conversations. 
Conclusion 
We found that registered Slashdot users could be divided intro three categories: 
those who never change the default comment display, those who use ratings to modify 
the comment display, and those who change the comment display to suppress ratings.  
Although a significant portion of users did not change from system set defaults, an even 
larger group of users employed ratings to modify how comments were displayed in 
forum.  Interestingly, a non-trivial segment of users made modifications to diminish the 
effects of comment rating.  For those users who don’t make changes, or only make 
changes rarely, we find some indication that friction exists, preventing ready changes to 
how comments are displayed.  This friction is related to the perceived cost of changing 
opposed to the perceived benefit for having done so. 
A possible remediation for this friction is to support dynamic comment view 
changes based on the behavior of other users.  One aspect of this is the use of schema 
labels as meta-data to create groups of user types, allowing high-friction users to take 
advantage of the customization done by others.  Another idea for of dynamic filtering is 
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to use the behavior or Slashdot readers who seem to have low friction and active reading 
patterns, i.e. lead users, to automatically change comment settings. 
This research indicates that Slashdot readers have different goals in reading 
comments, and widely support those goals by leveraging comment ratings.  However, 
some users do not take advantage of comment scores in displaying how comments are 
viewed, at least in part because of the friction involved in making a change.  Using the 
activities and preferences of those who do make such changes, we can consider design 
recommendations to enhance the use of ratings beyond the ways they have been used 
previously.  Creating schemas based on ratings use, and predicting preferences using the 
behaviors of lead users both offer new ways to leverage the feedback provided by ratings 
systems online. 
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Chapter 4                                                               
Follow the (Slash) dot: Effects of feedback on new members in 
an online community14 
Abstract 
Many virtual communities involve ongoing discussions, with large numbers of 
users and established, if implicit rules for participation.  As new users enter communities 
like this, both they and existing members benefit when new users learn the standards for 
participation.  Slashdot is a news and discussion site that has developed a system of 
distributed moderation to provide feedback about the value of posts on their site.  This 
study examines three explanations for how new users learn to participate in a digital 
community: learning transfer from previous experiences, observation of other members, 
and feedback from other members.  We find that new user behavior is affected by a 
combination of their viewing behavior, the moderation feedback they receive, and replies 
to their comments.  
Introduction 
According to a recent report by the Pew Internet and American Life Project 
(Madden and Rainie 2003), 25% of Internet users in the United States participate in 
online chat rooms or discussions, a number which has grown over recent years.  A person 
entering an online discussion is often joining a mature social system with existing 
                                                 
14 Published in collaboration with Erik Johnston. Lampe, C. and E. Johnston (2005). Follow the (Slash) dot: 
Effects of Feedback on New Members in an Online Community. International Conference on Supporting 
Group Work, GROUP '05, Sanibel Island, FL, ACM Press. 
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members and a developed sense of how members behave.  The entrance of new members 
into established discussions may be both potentially beneficial and potentially harmful to 
the operation of the online forum.  New members may provide additional energy and 
ideas to persistent digital communities.  However, the textual nature of most online 
discussions, and heterogeneity of online forums across the web, may make it difficult for 
new members to detect rules for how to behave.  When new users have trouble 
conforming to discussion standards they may increase information overload for the entire 
community and become more vulnerable to a wide variety of deception from 
misbehaving users.  
Many methods have been used to socialize new users in an online space.  
Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) documents often explicitly state a community’s values 
and procedures.  In some spaces new users must wait before being able to contribute 
content to ensure that they have time to observe the normal methods and types of 
participation. Some digital communities have sections allocated specifically for new 
users, often referred to as “newbie gardens”.  Online role-playing games often provide 
spaces like this for new users to learn system commands and interaction standards free of 
harassment from more experienced players. Another common method of socializing new 
users is to provide direct mentorship from more experienced community members.  A 
further method of shaping new user behavior is the use of feedback provided by the 
larger community, often in the form of rating systems that provide evaluations of new 
contributions.  
This research examines the role different mechanisms for learning might have in 
shaping new user behavior.  Are users coming to an online community with all the skills 
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they need to post highly rated comments?  Do new users observe others to determine how 
to write comments?  What role does feedback from other members play in shaping new 
user posting behavior? 
Effects as new users join online groups  
Online groups that are successful attract new members on an ongoing basis.  
Internet users interested in online discussion seek out groups that provide the maximum 
benefit for their investment of time and effort.  Joining persistent, large groups makes 
sense to the new member as they are able to see a wider array of viewpoints, and have 
their own messages viewed by more people (Hiltz and Turoff 1978; Palme 1995). A new 
member might observe the site as a passive participant before deciding to submit 
comments.   
Established discussion spaces also benefit from having new members.  New 
participants refresh interest and activity on a site (Powazek 2002).  New members can 
also replace users who have left the site for various reasons, keeping critical mass (Kim 
2000).  The existence of low barriers to entry and exit in most online discussion sites 
means that membership remains in a constant state of flux, which has the benefits of 
eliciting new viewpoints, renewing commitment, and maintaining a healthy size 
population.  However, there are problems that can occur when new members enter 
established communities. 
New members may increase information overload 
People have limited ability to perceive and process information (Miller 1962), as 
well as limited attention spans.  The propensity of the online environment to create 
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information overload was discussed by Hiltz and Turoff (Hiltz and Turoff 1985), who 
recommended designing computer mediated communication (CMC) systems specifically 
to reduce overload, including such elements as voting, moderation and sanctioning of 
anonymous members.  Jones et al. (Jones, Ravid et al. 2002) examined Usenet 
newsgroups and found that users are more likely to respond to simpler messages in 
situations of overload; that users will end participation as overload increases and that 
users generate simpler responses as overload increases.  Previously, Jones and Rafaeli 
(Jones and Rafaeli 1999) proposed that communication online takes an S-shaped pattern 
of frequency of occurrence.  Early in the existence of a conversation space, or “virtual 
public” to use their term, there is a struggle to achieve critical mass of people 
contributing to the conversation.  A sharp increase after that critical mass is achieved 
results in information overload, and communication levels off as participants are 
discouraged by the rate of messages.  Butler (Butler 2001) similarly found that more 
active listserv’s not only had more users entering the discussion, but that they lost users at 
a greater rate than smaller structures. 
New members may violate norms 
In offline communities, new members often learn how to behave by following the 
nonverbal cues of fellow participants, an ability which is often lost in the CMC context 
(Sproull and Kiesler 1991).  Online discussion spaces often have well-developed 
standards of behavior for how to proceed with conversation, including what constitutes a 
good post, how often one should post, and how to interact with other members.  
Violations of these norms can lead to misunderstanding, flame wars and other types of 
social breakdowns that occur in online communication.   Many online spaces have a 
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vocabulary that is specific to that venue (Crystal 2001).  Ignorance of special terms and 
requests for clarification can derail conversation and irritate experienced members.  It is 
often difficult to tell when a breach of etiquette is the result of innocent ignorance from a 
new user, or willful misbehavior.   
The digital community benefits when new members learn rules quickly.  Less 
time needs to be spent by experienced members in explaining terms and expectations 
(Whittaker, Terveen et al. 1998), which leads to more attention placed on discussion, the 
central activity of the community.   
New members may be vulnerable to deception 
Many types of misbehavior that take place in virtual public spheres specifically 
target new users.  “Trolling” is posting a comment designed to trick people into 
aggravated responses.  “The well-constructed troll is a post that induces lots of newbies 
and flamers to make themselves look even more clueless than they already do, while 
subtly conveying to the more savvy and experienced that it is in fact a deliberate troll. If 
you don't fall for the joke, you get to be in on it. (Raymond 2004)”.  Trolling often takes 
advantage of new user naïveté to elicit angry responses. 
In Multi-User Dungeons (MUDs) and Massively Multi-Player Online Roleplaying 
Games (MMORPGs) a category of player specifically targets new players, killing their 
carefully crafted characters (Reid 1999).  In response, these spaces have protected new 
members by leaving all players immune to harassment or by creating “newbie gardens”, 
areas where new members can operate safely. This form of protection is not commonly 
available in other types of digital communities, where new user contributions are often 
immediately compared with experienced members of the site.  
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New members may be ignored 
If the new member receives no attention from the community, they are likely to 
abandon the space for not appreciating them appropriately. New members who submit 
contributions to an online discussion have a hope that other members of the community 
will value their contribution.  New members might expect to feel that their contribution is 
worthwhile and the discussion is worth their effort if their comment receives attention in 
the form of replies.  Appropriate attention from other community members is likely to 
lead to future participation.  
Variables affecting participation outcomes 
To understand how new users learn how to participate appropriately for their roles in 
online communities we examine several methods for learning how to properly contribute 
in a new community. 
• Previous Experience 
o The new member has skills developed prior to joining the site either through 
formal education, or participation in similar forums with complementary 
standards. 
• Observation 
o The new member observes successful, experienced members and emulates them. 
• Feedback 
o The new member participates by posting a comment and their future contributions 
are shaped through direct feedback from other members through moderation and 
discussion. 
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The importance of previous experience in determining new user participation is 
based on the theory of learning transfer (Perkins and Salomon 1992), which argues that 
learning in one context enhances related performance in another context.  Observation is 
one component of the theory of situated learning [14], where new members observe 
experienced members before starting their own participation.  Learning through 
participation and feedback is grounded in behaviorist theories (Ilgen, Fisher et al. 1979), 
which claims that people can be shaped by feedback to learn new tasks.  We believe that 
each of these play a unique role in the learning process and by identifying the 
contribution of each, we will be able to make design recommendations that take 
advantage of the unique qualities of each of them.  
Transfer of learning from other digital communities 
It is possible that there is a universal standard for posting in online discussions, 
and that learning to post valued comments in, say, Usenet groups transfers to Web 
discussion boards.  Several guides of “netiquette” are available (Crystal 2001), and users 
participate in multiple discussion spaces at the same time (Madden and Rainie 2003).  It 
is unlikely that participants enter each virtual community tabula rasa, but rather transfer 
skills learned in other fora. This type of near transfer suggests that learning from a 
separate context enhances the ability to perform in a new context (Perkins and Salomon 
1992).   
Situated learning through observation of successful participants 
Many theories of learning point to the importance of observing others engaged in 
similar behaviors.  In a classic study, Bandura (Bandura 1973) found that children who 
observed adults attacking a doll were more likely to engage in that behavior than children 
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who did not observe the behavior.  In small groups, members often decide how to behave 
based on the actions of authority members of that group (Forsyth 1999).  Lave and 
Wenger (Lave and Wenger 1993) use the idea of apprenticeship to explain the different 
structure of learning in communities of practice.  Being an apprentice is not the same as 
being a pupil.  Apprenticeship for Lave here is learning as a peripheral participant that is 
learning to become a member of a community of practice through increasingly involved 
participation.  At the outset, new members participate simply by observing, learning the 
values and practices of the community before attempting to use them.    One starts out at 
the periphery by observing, but as one becomes a more central participant, feedback from 
other participants becomes increasingly important.  In a study of lurkers, Preece et al 
(Preece, Nonnecke et al. 2004) found that one of the main reasons given for remaining 
inactive was that the lurkers were observing the group to learn more about it.  Many 
digital communities also include pages of “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQs) that are 
intended to provide explicit guidelines on community expectations.  Often, standards for 
behavior are more implicit, and must be discovered by the new participant. 
Feedback from experienced users 
Finally, there are many ways in which new members of a discussion space may 
receive direct feedback from experienced participants.  Feedback has been shown to 
affect behavior depending on a variety of factors, including the perceived legitimacy of 
the feedback presenter, the ability of the recipient to understand the feedback and 
immediacy of the feedback given (Ilgen, Fisher et al. 1979).  Occasionally, an online 
discussion space will indicate how many times a message has been read.  New users may 
also receive feedback from existing members that indicates their contributions were 
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valued.  Two ways of providing feedback are examined in this study.  First, in some 
online communities users provide direct feedback in the form of ratings for contributions, 
assigning a numerical value to comments or rating a comment up or down from its 
current ranting.  Secondly, replies to a comment indicate to the author of the parent 
comment that they’ve not only been read, but that someone was affected enough by their 
comment to post a reply (Whittaker, Terveen et al. 1998; Smith 2002). 
Research questions 
To tie together participation outcomes for new users with alternate explanations 
for how they learn to participate, we generated several research questions, which we then 
attempt to answer using data from an active online community. 
Q1: How do new users behave when they first enter an established online community?   
Q1a: How do users react differently to different types of attention from other users? 
Q2: Is there a gap between how well new users think they understand valued 
participation, and how they are actually rated by other community members? 
Q2a: Is this potential gap associated with their previous experience? 
Q3: How are measures of learning transfer, observation and feedback related to 
participation outcomes for new users? 
Q3a: How is previous experience related to the first contribution a new user makes? 
Q3b: How are learning measures related to how comments are valued by other users? 
Q3c: How are learning measures related to whether new users post comments, and the 
rate at which they post? 
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Methods 
We studied users of a popular discussion site that uses a comment rating system to 
determine the relationship between these three methods of new user learning and initial 
participation outcomes.  This section describes the digital community we studied, data 
collected from that site, and a description of how the data is being used to describe the 
associations articulated above. 
Slashdot: News for nerds. Stuff that Matters 
Slashdot is a news and commentary site dedicated to technology issues, especially 
open source software.  It attracts about a third of a million unique users each day. As 
stories are posted, users of the site may comment on those stories.  Each story typically 
engenders several hundred comments, with some stories resulting in over a thousand 
comments.  After a comment has been posted, it can then be rated by another user with 
moderator eligibility.   
Slashdot is a large, active digital community with a strongly developed culture.  
This culture is expressed in special terms used by Slashdot, like calling anonymous 
posters “anonymous cowards”; in-jokes that Slashdot participants share, and elements of 
the Slashdot interface being used in the comments themselves, for example a signature 
file including admonitions that anyone disagrees with the poster is “-5: Wrong”, which 
references the Slashdot moderation system.  The structure of the site has accreted over 
time to respond to changing user needs.  New members entering the site receive feedback 
from moderators, but it is unclear how that feedback encourages or discourages 
participation.   
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Data collection 
Data collection included an analysis of server logs of 11,079 new users who made 
accounts on Slashdot between November 1, 2004 and December 6, 2004.  Whenever a 
Slashdot user loads a page, posts a comment, or rates another’s comment, a record of the 
interaction is kept on the server log.  These records are associated with specific users, 
stories, and times, allowing us to compare interactions between users.  Also, logs of user 
characteristics, including account creation date and reputation score as of December 6, 
2004 were gathered.   
Slashdot users may participate anonymously on the site without registering. 
Consequently, some portion of new users identified with this study had experience with 
the site prior to creating an account.  Our assumption is that this is an independent error 
term, not correlated with any of our independent measures, and consequently omitting it 
has no effect on our analysis.   
Other server information related to new users included logs of all moderations 
that took place during the study period, including ratings of new user comments.  
Additionally, we collected data on all comments made during the same time frame to 
compare new user activity with other users during the same time period.   
Besides the log analysis, we conducted surveys with 233 users who had created 
their accounts since November 1, 2004.  Respondents were recruited by an invitation to 
participate that appeared on Slashdot’s homepage in late November.  Survey respondents 
were tracked with a unique identifier that allows responses to be matched with log data.  
Survey invitations appeared for only a two day period, during which time only 3,341 
users identified in the dataset visited the site. The overall response rate for the study was 
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8%.   109 of the 233 survey respondents had not made any comments since creating their 
user accounts.  We checked responses between commenters and non-commenters and 
found no significant differences between their responses.   
We used the account creation date to identify new users. While it is possible to 
have multiple accounts, or post without creating an account, the culture of Slashdot 
discourages both of these behaviors. Since individuals can create multiple accounts on 
Slashdot, we also matched user IP addresses to see if new users were experienced users 
with new accounts.  We asked in the survey if the user has more than one account on 
Slashdot.  In the server logs we found several instances of multiple accounts from the 
same IP address which we excluded from the study.  No survey respondents reported 
other accounts or had IP addresses that matched those of other user accounts.  
Before examining individual user outcomes, we examined overall participation 
rates on Slashdot.  Out of 11,079 new users selected for study, 1763 users (16%) made 
6467 comments.  Of new users who commented, 55.1% made only one comment.  The 
maximum was 248 comments.  Of those who made any comments, the mean was 3.7, and 
the median was 1 comment.  New users who commented had a median of 28 minutes 
elapse between the creation of their account and the posting of their first comment.  
As has been found in other online settings (Jones 1997), drop out rates of new 
users are high.  To get a sense of how many people abandon their accounts on Slashdot, 
we studied the 1000 users of the site who had created their accounts between November 
1, 2004 and November 10, 2004.  Of these users, 5% had visited only one Slashdot page 
by December 6, 2004.  25% of this sample only looked at 10 or fewer pages.  The median 
number of site pages loaded by a new user was 39, and the mean number was 101.  The 
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maximum number of pages loaded by one of these users was 4035, with 27.5% of users 
viewing more than 100 pages over the study period. 
Measuring alternate explanations of learning 
As mentioned above, we have focused on three explanations for how new users 
learn to participate in an environment like Slashdot: learning transfer from previous 
experience, observation of other members, and feedback from other members. 
To approximate previous experiences with commenting, we asked news users 
questions in the online survey about their experience in online forums, self-rated 
computer expertise and education level.  We asked survey respondents to rate their own 
experience in discussion sites other than Slashdot on a scale from 1 to 7.  On average, 
respondents scored a 4.3 out of 7 for experience in other sites, with a high percentage in 
the highest category.  We also asked respondents to rate their own expertise with 
computers.  Respondents rated themselves as very expert with computers, an average of 
5.97 on a scale of 1 to 7. Survey respondents were also asked about their level of 
education.  Over 50% of respondents reported having a college degree or graduate 
degree, with an additional 34% claiming some level of college experience.   
Observation behavior is captured in two ways.  First, the amount of time between 
when a user creates their account and when they post their first comment is collected.  
While some exceptions will exist, it could be that the longer the time spent between these 
two events indicates more time viewing the site.  Since the exceptions to this might be 
significant, we also collected page request information for users.  An error in logging 
prevented the collection of timestamp information on individual page requests, so we 
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only know overall page requests during the study period.  Using the overall page requests 
made by the user over he study period, we coded users into low frequency and high 
frequency site viewers.  
User feedback is captured in two ways. Each comment from our new users begins 
with the default score of +1, which can change based on moderations from other users.  
We collected the final scores.  Additionally, we mark the number of replies a comment 
receives as a form of feedback, as it indicates to the new user that their comment was not 
only read, but regarded enough by other users to engender a reply.   
Table 4.1 summarizes the measures of learning described above.  Measures in 
dark gray are associated with learning transfer from previous experiences, those in light 
gray with observing other users, and those in white with feedback from other users. 
Table 4.1: Summary of measures used to detect different types of learning. 
Variable Explanation 
Online experience Survey measure of how much 
experience users felt they had in 
online discussion forums. 
Computer expertise Survey measure of how expert the 
respondent felt they were with 
computers. 
Education level Survey measure of the last educational 
degree the respondent received. 
Observation time Time between when a new user 
creates an account and time they post 
their first comment. 
Hit frequency How frequently the new user posts 
page views from the site. 
Score The score a user’s comments receive 
through moderation. 
Replies The number of replies a user’s 
comments receive from other users. 
 
New user participation outcomes 
There are several participation outcomes for new users that we use as estimates of 
their integration into the Slashdot forum.  We developed three indicators of desirable new 
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user participation on the site: scores of comments written by the new user, the rate at 
which comments are posted, and the overall number of comments made. 
The scores of comments accumulated through the distributed moderation system 
act as one measure that the contributor is valued by the community.  The higher the 
average score of comments posted by a user, the more likely that user is valued.  For this 
work, we look at the score of the first comments users make, as well as the average 
scores of their comment.  We look at first comment scores because they show whether 
the new user starts as a highly valued participant, or if they start being valued little by the 
community initially, as measured by comment scores, but subsequently improve over 
time.   
The amount of time that a user waits between posts may also indicate desirable 
participation.  In particular, delays between the first comment a user makes and the 
second may indicate they were turned off  by the response to the first comment, while 
less delay may indicate that the user was drawn into the system. 
Another measure of successful participation is the number of comments they post 
during the study period.  It is beneficial to have members post comments, although too 
many posts may indicate problematic participation.   
Table 4.2 summarizes measures of participation outcomes for new Slashdot users 
included in this study. 
Table 4.2: Summary of measures of participation outcomes. 
Measure Explanation 
First score Score that a new user’s first comment 
receives through moderation. 
Probability of 
second comment 
The probability that a user will post a 
second comment after having posted a 
first. 
Time to post 
second comment 
Time it takes a user to post a second 
comment after posting a first 
Score change Difference between the scores a new 





Total number of comments a user 
made over the study period. 
 
Results 
The results of our analysis of new user behavior are structured to attempt to 
answer the research questions raised earlier.  The first section describes initial user 
contributions, and how participation differs among users who receive different scores on 
their first comments.  The second section addresses user beliefs about their ability to 
create valued messages and how their actual scores do or do not match that perception.  
The third section analyzes participation outcomes in terms of the measures of alternative 
learning methods described above. 
How do new users behave when they first come to Slashdot? 
To describe more fully how initial moderation affects participation, we examined 
posting patterns for the first three comments made by users.  How many users start with 
negative ratings, yet go on to future success?  Which types of moderation are associated 
with users ceasing to post comments?  Figure 4.1 shows the moderation outcome of the 
first three comments new users made in the dataset being studied.  In the chart, the 
possible outcomes are “Up” for when a user receives positive feedback through the rating 
system, “None” for when the moderation receives no ratings, “Down” for when the 
comment receives negative feedback through moderation and “Out” for when the user 
does not make additional comments.  
New users who received no moderation were less likely to make a second 
comment than users who received either positive or negative initial feedback through 
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moderation.  Even when a user receives feedback on their first comment, lack of 
feedback on the second is associated with approximately 30% of users to ceasing 
commenting.   
There is some indication that receiving two negative moderations in a row make it 
unlikely that a user will receive a positive moderation.  Though the numbers in this 
analysis are too low to be certain of the pattern, each path followed to the 5th comment 
show no occasions where two down ratings were followed by a future up rating. 
Another interesting pattern is the recovery of users whose first comment was rated 
negatively.  In those cases where the second comment received positive rating, 4 out of 
the 5 cases where there were third comments were also rated positively, and none of them 
received a negative rating on their third comment. However, there is also a finding that 
some people that receive initial negative feedback continue to make comments that are 
commented negatively. This propensity increases at each level suggesting that negative 
feedback is the goal of some users, or alternatively that the user pool at this level only 
contains those contributors who are unable to write valued comments. 
These descriptions of moderation outcomes indicate that some change is 
happening to users between the times they post comments.  The direction of moderation 
does seem to have some relationship with how future comments will be rated, but with 
this data it is unwise to make a strong causal claim.  It does seem possible given these 
patterns that Slashdot participants are using the moderation system as a sounding board to 
craft their future comments.  This is consistent with Goffman’s argument (Goffman 
1963) that individuals acting in a public place are “performing” for some perceived 
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audience.  In the Slashdot case, users might be using the feedback provided through 
moderation to adjust their performance. 
Figure 4.1: A diagram of posting outcomes based on moderation. 
 
 
New users believe they can detect a good comment. 
One sign that new members of Slashdot are detecting the values of a discussion 
space is that they agree about what makes a comment highly valued.  In Lampe and 
Resnick (Lampe and Resnick 2004) we found that moderators on the site widely agree on 
what constitutes a good comment, as measured by their agreement on the score of a 
comment.  To analyze whether new users similarly agree that they can detect a good 
comment, we asked several survey questions about their confidence in their ability to 
detect a highly rated comment. 
Most new Slashdot members felt that they could readily detect expectations for 
posting a good comment.  Means reported below are on a scale of 1-5, where 1 indicates 
low agreement and 5 indicates high agreement.  In four questions related to confidence in 
their ability to detect valued comments on the site, users strongly agreed that they knew 
what a good comment was (mean=3.95, C.I. 3.83≤x≤4.07), could tell why a comment had 
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received the score it did (mean=3.72, C.I. 3.59≤x≤3.85), felt the expectations for writing 
a good comment were clear (mean=3.43, C.I. 3.29≤x≤3.58) and could write a comment 
that would be highly scored (mean=3.66, C.I. 3.51≤x≤3.81).  In addition, the values for 
the purpose of the moderation system were strongly shared amongst new users, who 
agreed strongly that moderation should be used to promote well written contributions 
(mean=4.24, C.I. 4.12≤x≤4.36) as opposed to supporting particular viewpoints 
(mean=1.96, C.I. 1.80≤x≤2.12). 
New members also strongly agreed when asked if discussion on Slashdot was 
worthwhile compared to other sites (mean=4.10, C.I. 3.97≤x≤4.23), and that the 
moderation system is important in fostering discussion on Slashdot (mean=4.19, C.I. 
4.05≤x≤4.32).  The strong agreement on the questions reported above seems to indicate 
that new members of Slashdot believe they know what constitutes a good comment.   
To determine whether a user’s impressions of how well they understand how to 
write a valued comment is related to their eventual ability to write a valued comment, we 
used the Spearman’s rho statistic to correlate survey responses with the average score of 
comments a user received.  Spearman’s rho is a measure of relationship between ordinal 
variables, and consequently a better choice here than the more common Pearson’s 
correlation statistic.  The average score users’ comments received was poorly correlated 
with whether the user reported they were confident they could write a comment that 
would be rated highly (r=0.14, p<0.15, n=113), whether they felt the expectations for 
highly rated comments was clear (r=0.09, p<0.32, n=114), whether they felt they 
understood why a comment received the score it did (r=0.10, p<0.29, n=120) or how 
concerned the user was with the scores their comments receive (r=0.03, p<0.72, n=120). 
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Even though Slashdot users widely agreed that they knew what constituted a highly rated 
comment on the site, that belief does not seem to be associated with actual production of 
highly rated comments.  This could be because Slashdot users actually have very 
different opinions about what would constitute a highly rated comment, and only believe 
that other agree with them.  It could also be that some users are creating comments they 
know are not going to be highly rated. 
Mechanisms that affect user contributions 
In this section we examine first comment scores, whether and how quickly a 
second comment is posted, total number of comments posted and average ratings of 
comments posted by a user.   For each of these user outcomes, we look at our 
operationalizations of user learning to determine effects. 
First comment scores 
When a new user creates their first comment, they have not had the opportunity to 
benefit from direct community feedback, but they may be affected by learning they bring 
from other experiences, or by observing the site prior to posting a first comment 
Table 4.3 reports an ordinary least squares regression predicting the initial score a 
comment will receive based on measures of previous experience and observation.  This 
model shows that the measures of previous experience and observation of other users 
poorly predict the how the first comment made by a new user on the site will be rated by 
others.  It could be that the measures of experience and observation do not adequately 
represent their real values.  Another explanation is that users entering Slashdot for the 
106 
first time share many characteristics, including ability to write comments with little 
difference between users.   
Table 4.3: Ordinary least squares regression predicting score of first user comment. 
R-square 0.06 
df 5,61 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
Constant .826 0.753 .454 
Forum experience -0.055 -0.560 .578 
Computer expertise 0.066 0.364 .717 
Education level 0.173 1.207 .232 
Page views 0.000 0.996 .323 
Observation time 0.000 -0.866 .390 
 
To assess possible explanations for these findings, we also analyzed the different 
independent variables separately with the score of the first comment.  We did not find 
any significant relationships between any of the independent variables individually and 
the score of a user’s first comment. 
Likelihood of posting a second comment 
Many things may happen after a user has posted their first comment.  The 
comment may be rated positively negatively by other members of the discussion board.  
Some users may decide to reply to the comment.  For some users, their first comment 
may be completely ignored.   
As mentioned above, 55.1% of new users on Slashdot made only one comment to 
the site during the study period.  As shown in Figure 4.1, what happens to the first 
comment a user makes seems to have some relationship with whether they will post a 
second comment or not.  What predicts whether the new user will post a second 
comment?  Of the different outcomes for a comment, do any of them predict that a 
second comment will follow? 
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Table 4.4 reports a logistic regression predicting the binary outcome of whether a 
new user will post a second comment: positive coefficients indicate higher probabilities.  
Whether the first comment a new user makes is replied to, and whether that comment was 
rated, or not, by the moderation system appear to be poor predictors of whether a user will 
post a second comment.  Time between creating an account and posting the first comment, 
as well as how heavily the user requested page views were better predictors of the 
likelihood of posting a second comment.   
Table 4.4: Logistic regression predicting if a new user will post a second question. 
Pseudo R-squared 0.14 
n 1704 
 Coef. Z P>|z| 
1st com replied to  -0.563 1.32 .251 
1st comment was rated -0.198 0.97 .325 
Time between acct creation 
and first post 0.001 9.21 .002 
Frequency of page views 0.005 37.29 .001 
Constant .720 2.08 .001 
 
However, the R-squared value of this model indicates that many important factors 
that predict posting a second comment are not being accounted for.  
Time to post second comment 
The gap in time between when a user posts their first comment and when they 
post their second may be an important indicator of socialization.  If the user has a 
negative first experience, it may take them longer to post again.  Consequently, even if 
feedback does not affect whether a user will post a second comment, it might affect how 
they do so. 
The average time between first and second post for those users who made a 
second comment was 2.6 days, and the median time was 5.7 hours.  This disparity is 
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caused by some outlying users who had large amounts of time between their first and 
second posts.  
Time to post a second comment was not strongly correlated with online forum 
experience (r=-0.20, n=88), computer experience (r=-0.18, n=87) or education level (r=-
0.13, n=87).  For measures of observation, how frequently the user requests page views 
was not related to time lag between first and second comments (r=0.04, n=392).  The 
amount of time users spent observing the site before posting their first comment also had 
only a weak relationship between the time difference in posting first and second 
comments (r=0.09, n=780). 
Table 4.5 shows measures of user feedback in terms of whether the first comment 
a new user posted was rated up, down or ignored, as well as whether that comment was 
replied to.  Using these different first comment outcomes as separate groups, we measure 
the median time difference between posting the first and second comments in terms of 
different first comment outcomes. 
Table 4.5: Time to post second comment based on first comment outcomes. 
First comment outcome Median time to 
post 2nd comment 
First comment rated down 50 minutes 
First comment not rated 9.8 hours 
First comment rated up 4.2 hours 
First comment replied to 1.4 hours 
First comment not replied to 7.1 hours 
 
Users who received no rating on their first comments also took much longer to 
post a second comment.  Users who received a negative rating on their first comment 
were the quickest to post a second comment.  This could result from several factors.  One 
might be that negative attention in the form of negative ratings causes users to want to 
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prove themselves as positive contributors.  It could also be that some of these users are 
writing inflammatory content, which they post more often and is rated negatively. 
Table 4.6 shows the multivariate explanations that predict how many minutes pass 
between posting a first and second comment.  Survey measures are excluded from the 
model as they were found to be unassociated with time in the univariate analysis.  The 
amount of time between account creation and posting a first comment minorly reduces 
the time to post a second comment.  The major factor seems to be whether the first 
comment a new user writes is rated up, which reduces the overall time to post a second 
comment. 
Table 4.6: Ordinary least squares regression for time in minutes to post a second 
comment. 
R-square 0.06 
df 5, 386 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
Constant 7787.90 12.064 .001 
Observation time -0.002 -2.580 .010 
Page views -1.977 -1.327 .185 
First comment up -3939.80 -3.639 .001 
First com. down -1983.14 -0.974 .331 
First com. replied -1394.07 -0.719 .472 
 
Users who received replies to their first comment took less than a third of the time 
than those who did not to post a second comment, though this difference did not appear 
to be a significant factor in the regression model.  The strong difference in users who are 
initially rated down was also revised by the multivariate analysis; it does not look like 
being rated down on a first comment affects time to post a second comment when 
considered with other factors.  It does seem that positive feedback from other users 
through ratings does reduce the overall time to post a second comment.  However, this 
model also has a low r-squared value, indicating that many variables important to this 
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measure are not included.  It is likely that one of these missing variables would help 
explain the difference in findings about the importance of replies in the model versus the 
univariate analysis. 
Score of second comment 
Another measure that a difference nonrandomly occurs between a user’s first and 
second comments to the site is the difference in scores between the first comment posted 
by the user and the second. 
Table 4.7 shows an ordinary least squares regression predicting the change in 
score from the first comment to the second.  This model shows that if the first comment 
receives a positive result, it has a negative effect on the score of the second comment, and 
vice versa if the first comment received a negative score.   Whether the first comment 
was replied to does not seem to be a factor, though number of page views has a small, but 
significant effect on the score of the second comment.  The findings for the reverse roles 
of initial up and down may be a result of regression towards the mean, i.e. that initial 
scores have an element of randomness, and second scores correct the arbitrary high and 
low scores of the first comment.  This is supported by the correlation between the scores 
of the first and second comments a user makes (r=0.174, p<.001, n=792).  
Table 4.7: Ordinary least squares regression predicting score of the second comment. 
R-square 0.34 
df 5, 386 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
Constant 0.262 3.009 .003 
Observation time 0.000 0.412 .681 
Page views 0.000 2.347 .019 
First comment up -1.790 -12.155 .001 
First com. down 1.286 4.670 .001 
First com. replied -0.062 -0/238 .812 
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Number of comments posted 
Although it can be dangerous to have too many comments posted, having new 
users create comments is a measure that they are involved in the digital community.  
Consequently, we looked at the overall number of comments new users made during the 
study period, and which factors were associated with frequency of posting. 
New users made an average of 26 comments over the study period, with a median of 9 
comments.  15% of new users only made one comment, and one user was responsible for 
248 comments. 
The overall number of comments posted was not strongly correlated with online 
forum experience (r=0.17, n=124), computer experience (r=0.10, n=122) or education 
level (r=-0.06, n=121).  However, the overall number of comments was relatively 
strongly correlated to how frequently the user requested page views (r=0.52, n=69) and 
the time lapse between their account creation and when they posted their first comment 
(r=0.38, n=124).  This could mean that users who read the site more often are more 
willing to post comments.  A design implication of this might be that site administrators 
could detect frequent viewers early on, and mark them as potentially valuable participants 
early in their tenure on the site. 
Table 4.8 presents an ordinary least squares regression model predicting the 
overall number of comments a user will make.  Since measures of experience are 
unrelated to total comments in univariate analysis, they are excluded from the model. 
In the model, observation time and frequency of page views are both related to the overall 
number of comments a user makes, whereas the direction of initial moderation and the 
first reply a comment receives are not.  One could imagine an active user who both 
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comments and reads frequently, but is no better at writing comments than any other user.  
Other work has shown that often a few authors are responsible for the majority of 
messages in an online conversation forum (Viegas and Smith 2004).  This seems to 
present a consistent view of the role between reading activity and posting. 
Table 4.8: Ordinary least squares regression predicting number of comments. 
R-square 0.23 
df 5, 386 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
Constant 4.551 4.176 .001 
Observation time -0.003 -2.741 .006 
Page views 0.026 10.252 .001 
First comment up 1.760 0.955 .340 
First com. down -1.585 -0.460 .646 
First com. replied -5.019 -1.537 .125 
 
Discussion 
New members entering an existing online community face a complicated, often 
overwhelming environment where it is hard to know how to act.  Slashdot is an unusual 
digital community, with a distinct, techno-centric culture and design that has accreted 
over a long time.  We feel this makes Slashdot an especially interesting case study in that 
new members of this space are likely to have an especially hard time learning the 
standards of practice for posting comments. 
Previous experience did not seem to have a relationship with how highly rated a 
user’s first comment becomes.  Although Slashdot users report they have high levels of 
experience in other online discussion forums, that experience does not seem to translate 
into automatic success on the site. 
New users felt they could write a comment that would be highly valued, but when 
their comments were rated there was no relationship between that belief and the actual 
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score of the comment.  This could mean that there is high variability in what users see as 
“valued” comments.   
The patterns of moderation outcomes for the first three comments new users 
contribute suggest intriguing implications.  It is clear that many users choose not to 
continue contributing comments after their first, though the reason for this is less clear.  
Being rated up on a first comment does not seem to affect whether a user will post again 
or not, but it does seem to affect how quickly a second post will happen.  Active users as 
measured by time spent observing the site before commenting and frequency of page 
views are more likely to post a second comments and more comments overall. 
The high rates of drop out among new members points to an alternate use of 
feedback through the rating system, namely encouraging users to select themselves out of 
the population.  In formulating this research, we focused on learning how to participate in 
a way that will be valued.  It could be that ratings provide a way to determine whether to 
continue participation on the site. 
There is some indication from the change is scores from first comments to second 
that initial scores might be random, and future comments regress towards a mean score.  
If this is true, then there are serious implications for how rating systems might affect new 
users.  New users who receive undeserved, somewhat random negative attention might 
prematurely drop out of a discussion forum.   
Limitations and future work 
This study is an initial examination of new user behavior in a persistent digital 
community, and is largely intended only to describe different participation outcomes.  We 
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look at the relationship between different user variables and how they participate on the 
site.  By describing this case we are hoping to motivate continued examination of how 
new users become socialized when entering persistent digital communities.  
This work depends on findings from one case: Slashdot.  This site is an 
exceptional case in many ways, being one of the few online discussion forums to use 
distributed moderation, and having developed their structure over many years.  We feel, 
for example, that the general finding that users who receive attention from experienced 
members will participate differently can be generalized to a wider variety of digital 
communities.  In the Slashdot case, attention came in the form of ratings and replies from 
other members, while in the section above we mention other possible forms of attention 
site designers could use.  We hope that rather than being an exception to other online 
interactions, the Slashdot case provides a leading example of how interactions might be 
shaped with different elements of observation and user feedback. 
In the next stage of this work it is essential to more directly address causality.  
One experiment in consideration is to randomly assign new users on Slashdot into groups 
where they receive controlled amounts of feedback and measuring how their future 
participation differs.   
Another important data collection effort for future work will be more open-ended 
interactions with Slashdot users, either through more sophisticated survey work, or 
through interviews.  For example, many Slashdot users never create an account, and for 
those who do it is unclear why they choose to do so.  If a Slashdot user participates 
anonymously for a year and then creates an account, it is wrong to say they are a “new” 
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user.  More qualitative work might be able to address this issue where server log analysis 
has not. 
Although the survey provided interesting insight into the beliefs of the new 
Slashdot members, future work with this population should include additional measures 
of digital community experiences.  Additional questions related to frequency and depth of 
participation in other forums would be valuable new information.  Future work should 
also include more specific information about the specific pages being accessed by new 
users. 
Conclusion 
The findings from this study indicate that participation outcomes for new users 
are affected by a mix of previous experiences, observation of other members, and 
feedback received through ratings and replies.  Each play distinct roles in whether and 
how a new user will participate on the site, and how that participation will be viewed by 
the larger community.   
These findings are potentially important for designers of digital communities who 
need to plan for incorporating new members into their ongoing social structures.  Since 
page loads were associated with valued contributions, designers could require a certain 
number of visits to the site before allowing posting.  Initial ratings, either up or down, 
were associated with future posting activity, so sites might develop rules different for 
rating new users than for regular contributors. 
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Chapter 5                                                               
Slash(dot) and Burn: Distributed Moderation  
in a Large Online Conversation Space15 
 
Abstract 
Can a system of distributed moderation quickly and consistently separate high and 
low quality comments in an online conversation? Analysis of the site Slashdot.org suggests 
that the answer is a qualified yes, but that important challenges remain for designers of 
such systems. Thousands of users act as moderators. Final scores for comments are 
reasonably dispersed and the community generally agrees that moderations are fair. On the 
other hand, posting happens quickly and much of a conversation can pass before the best 
and worst comments are identified. Of those moderations that were judged unfair, only 
about half were subsequently counterbalanced by a moderation in the other direction. And 
comments with low scores, not at top-level, or posted late in a conversation were more 
likely to be overlooked by moderators.  
Introduction 
Participants in online conversations have diverse goals. Some readers want to be 
informed, some to be amused. Some posters want to inform or amuse, some want to 
compete, and others want merely to be noticed.   
                                                 
15 This work published with Paul Resnick (Lampe and Resnick 2004)Lampe, C. and P. Resnick (2004). 
Slash(dot) and burn: distributed moderation in a large online conversation space. Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems (CHI), Vienna, Austria, ACM Press. 
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In conversation spaces with limited access and few participants, individuals can 
allocate their attention and informal social mechanisms can reduce disruptive behavior.  In 
conversational spaces with low entry barriers and hundreds or thousands of participants, 
governance is more problematic (Kollock and Smith 1996). Such colorful expressions as 
trolling, flaming, spamming, and flooding have emerged to describe behaviors that benefit 
some people while disrupting others’ ability to get what they want from a conversational 
space (Whittaker, Terveen et al. 1998; Pfaffenberger 2002). Even absent deliberately 
disruptive behavior, too many postings can lead to information overload. More participants 
in conversation spaces is empirically correlated with more turnover of participation (Butler 
1999; Jones, Ravid et al. 2002), one indicator of user dissatisfaction. 
Various methods have been used to limit the disruption that anti-social behavior can 
cause, and to help readers cope with information overload. Properties of messages (e.g., 
length) or their contents (e.g., shared word usage with other messages (Sack 2000)) can be 
identified automatically. Individual or group kill files can be created to censor particular 
authors or properties of message authors (e.g., frequency of posting or frequency of being 
responded to) can be calculated automatically and used to classify messages (Smith and 
Fiore 1991). 
The judgments of other people, however, are often the best indicator of which 
messages are worth attending to. In small to medium size conversations, an individual can 
act as moderator, screening all candidate messages. This gives the moderator a lot of 
power, more than other participants are comfortable with in some situations. Moreover, a 
single moderator, or even a small team of moderators, simply can’t keep up if there are too 
many messages to evaluate. 
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Beginning with the Tapestry system (Goldberg, Nichols et al. 1992), researchers 
and developers have explored ways to collect and use the judgments of the general 
readership rather than just a few designated leaders. These distributed moderation systems 
have only recently been deployed in large scale conversation spaces. There has been little 
opportunity to evaluate how well they function at classifying posts, how those 
classifications affect reader behavior, and how they affect posting behavior. 
This paper focuses on only the moderation process itself. Even leaving aside 
questions of how moderation impacts readers and writers, fundamental questions remain. 
The most fundamental is whether shared norms can emerge about what constitutes a good 
or bad post, with most moderators following those norms most of the time, or whether 
tastes differ in fundamental ways, so that more personalized recommendations need to be 
made, using collaborative filtering techniques (Resnick, Iacovou et al. 1994; Shardanand 
and Maes 1995; Terveen and Hill 2002).  
A theoretical investigation of incentives for provision of evaluations (Avery, 
Resnick et al. 1999) described several potential problems. One is underprovision.  Some or 
all posts may get insufficient attention from moderators, or there could be long delays from 
the time a comment is posted until it is moderated.  Another potential problem is premature 
negative consensus. Messages that receive early negative moderation might get insufficient 
attention from other moderators, and thus moderation mistakes would not be corrected. 
Slashdot presents a unique opportunity to investigate empirically how distributed 
moderation plays out in practice. The site has honed its moderation system over several 
years and norms of usage have had plenty of time to develop. Thus, remaining problems 
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should reflect subtle issues that are not immediately apparent or fundamental problems for 
which there is no easy fix.  
Methods 
We analyzed usage logs for the period extending from May 31, 2003 through July 
30, 2003.  The logs included information for each comment, moderation and meta-
moderation that took place.  User data included the karma scores of users and whether they 
were regular users or paid editors. The dataset includes 293,608 moderations, 489,948 
comments, and 1,576,937 meta-moderations.  
Our primary method of inquiry was to look for patterns in the usage logs. Because 
there are so many observations in our datasets, the differences we report are all strongly 
statistically significant, and we omit reporting measures of significance in most cases. We 
also conducted interviews with three Slashdot editors, reviewing early findings and asking 
for clarification and explication of certain phenomena.   
We begin with summary statistics about levels of participation in the moderation 
and meta-moderation systems and the distribution of scores for comments. Next, we 
examine whether there was a community consensus about what constitutes a good or bad 
comment. Third, we examine how long it took to identify good and bad comments. Fourth, 
we examine whether moderations judged to be unfair by meta-moderators were corrected 
with subsequent moderations. Finally, we investigate whether there are some types of 
messages that receive unfair treatment or insufficient attention from moderators. 
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Participation Levels and Outcomes 
There is widespread participation in the moderation and meta-moderation systems. 
24,069 distinct users moderated during the two month period and the median number of 
moderations per moderator was 7 (mean 13). Because the system deliberately limited the 
amount of moderation any individual can perform, the maximum number of moderations 
completed by anyone other than paid staff was 164, less than three per day.  Paid staff, who 
have unlimited moderator points, accounted for only 2.4% of the total moderations. 18,799 
distinct users meta-moderated and the median per person was 25 (mean 84). 
There is a partial but not complete overlap between moderators and posters. Of 
users who commented, 41% also moderated. Of moderators, 68% also commented while 
32% (nearly 8000 users) were lurkers who never posted during the two month period.  
Participation overlap between commenting and metamoderation was similar, but somewhat 
lower.  Of users who commented, 31% also meta-moderated. Of those who meta-
moderated, 66% also commented. 
During the study period, 28% of comments received at least one moderation during 
the study period.  Of those that did, 48% received only one moderation.  The highest 
number of moderations on a comment during this study period was 51, though historically 
there have been rare comments that have received over a hundred. In keeping with the 
stated guidelines, the overwhelming majority of moderations, 79%, were positive.  
There was a reasonable dispersion of final scores, as shown in Figure 5.1. About one in 
four comments finished with a score of –1 or 0, about one in ten with a score of 4 or 5. 
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Is there a community consensus about which comments should receive up and 
down moderations? One indicator of disagreement would be the frequency of comments 
receiving both positive and negative moderations. Among comments that received 
moderation, 65% received only positive moderation, 20% only negative, and 15% received 
both.  
Metamoderations provide a more direct indicator of the extent of community 
consensus about norms for moderation. 92% of all metamoderations indicated agreement 
with the moderations they evaluated. The rate was even higher for positive moderations, 
94%. There was less consensus, however, about negative moderations, with only 77% 
agreement from meta-moderators. 
While most users seem to diverge occasionally from total community consensus, 
true “rebel” moderators were rare.  Only 14% of moderators were never metamoderated as 
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unfair, but 72% of moderators received more than 5/6 “fair” metamoderations.  For 453 
moderators, about 2% of the pool, more than half the metamoderations disagreed with the 
direction of their moderations.  
Moderation Delays 
A comment is eligible for moderation for up to two weeks after it is posted.  A 
major purpose of the distributed moderation system, however, is to help readers allocate 
their attention. For that reason, it is desirable for moderation to occur as quickly as 
possible.  
We do not have data on the distribution of elapsed time from comment posting to 
reading. However, to get a sense of the time scale of conversations, we computed each 
story’s “half-conversation life”, the elapsed time until half of the total comments on the 
story were posted. The median half-conversation life among stories was 174 minutes, or 
just under three hours. The median time for a story to accumulate 90% of its comments was 
1060 minutes, or about eighteen hours. 
Among comments that received some moderation, the median time until receiving 
the first moderation was 83 minutes. Perhaps a more useful metric is how much time 
elapsed before a moderation first pushed a comment to a score of +4 or down to 0 or –1, as 
shown in Table 1.  More than 40% of comments that reached a +4 score took longer to do 
so than 174 minutes, the time at which a typical conversation was already half over. More 
than 20% of the comments that were downgraded to 0 or –1 took at least that long. (Merely 
starting with a score of 0 or –1, without receiving a negative moderation, did not count as 
being downgraded in this timing analysis.) 
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Table 5.1: Time to reach benchmark scores. 
Time in minutes 
Percentile 
to reach a 
score >= 4 
(n=47,474) 












Reversing Unfair Moderations 
We have already seen that most moderations conform to community standards, as 
expressed through the meta-moderation system. Ideally, after an incorrect negative 
moderation, someone else would moderate the comment positively, and vice versa. We call 
this a moderation reversal. 
In practice, less fair moderations were more likely to be reversed, as shown in 
Figure 5.2.  However, even moderations that all or almost all meta-moderations disagreed 
with were reversed less than half the time. Unfair positive moderations (as judged by at 
least 2/3 of the meta-moderators) were reversed 34% of the time, and unfair negative 
moderations were reversed 40% of the time. 
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Theories from information economics suggest two reasons why comments of equal 
quality may not end up with equal scores through the moderation process. First, some 
comments may get less attention from moderators, so there is less chance that they will be 
moved from their current scores (Avery, Resnick et al. 1999). Second, there may be a 
herding or information cascade effect, where moderators are influenced by previous 
moderations either to remain silent or to contribute another moderation in the same 
direction (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1989; Banerjee 1992). 
Either insufficient attention or information cascades could result in buried treasures, 
comments that should have high scores but do not. The previous section’s results on low 
reversal rates suggest that incorrect moderations did cause some treasures to be buried (and 
some trash to be surfaced). Systematic biases that make some types of comments more 
likely to be buried would be even more troubling. 
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Moderators may give insufficient attention to comments with low scores, response 
comments (as opposed to top-level comments that start new threads), or comments added 
later in the conversation.  Though moderators are encouraged to scan all comments, they 
can use viewing thresholds in the same way as other readers, so that lower-scoring 
comments would be hidden and responses would need higher scores than top-level 
comments would need to be visible.  And if moderators look through all the comments 
posted so far and some moderators read early in the conversation, the early posts will be 
looked at by more moderators than will later posts. 
In fact, comments with lower starting scores were less likely to be moderated. For 
example, 30% of comments starting at 2 received a moderation, compared to only 29% of 
those starting at 1, 25% of those starting at 0, and 9% of those starting at -1. Table 5.2, 
which compares initial to final scores, shows that comments that started with higher scores 
tended to finish with higher scores. 
Of top-level comments, 48% received some moderation, compared to 22% for 
response comments. The mean final score for top-level comments was 1.73, as compared to 
1.40 for responses. 
Finally, comments posted later fared less well in the moderation process. We 
categorized comments into quintiles: the first fifth of comments on each story are classified 
as early, the last fifth as late. Of early comments, 59% were moderated, compared to 25% 
for comments in the middle of the conversation and 7% for late comments. The mean final 
score for early comments was 1.77, compared to 1.46 for comments in the middle of the 
conversation and 1.24 for late comments. 
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Of course, the lower probability of moderation and lower final scores do not 
necessarily imply problems of insufficient attention from moderators or information 
cascades. Instead, they may correctly indicate  lower quality or less valued messages. For 
example, late comments may be less likely to contribute new ideas to a conversation.  
Below we describe three potential confounds, characteristics of comments or the people 
that posted them that may be the true cause of moderation differences and that may be 
correlated with the starting score, with whether a comment is at top-level, and with whether 
a comment comes late in a conversation. Table 5.2 shows correlations among the variables 
of interest. We then controlled for the potential confounds in regression analyses. 
 
Table 5.2: Initial and final comment scores 
 Ending score Total 
  -1 0 1 2 3 4 5   
-1 93.4% 3.8% 1.2% .6% .4% .2% .4%
0 13.3% 76.3% 5.9% 1.9% .8% .6% 1.3%
1 








2 0.00% 0.00% 2.1% 71.0% 11.2% 4.9% 10.8%
Number of 
comments 21,753 107,169 265,800 42,379 17,417 19,518 15,912 489,948
Anonymous Posts 
The first potential confound is whether the poster chose to remain anonymous. 
Research on anonymous posting indicates that the higher the anonymity of the user, the 
more likely their contribution is to have lower value.  This lower value can be expressed as 
off-topic, flaming behavior, or in lower quality submissions (Friedman and Resnick 1997).  
Anonymous posting is correlated with lower starting scores at Slashdot, since all 
anonymous posts start with a score of 0. As shown in Table 5.3, anonymous posts were 
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more likely to be responses rather than at top-level, but they were less likely to come late in 
a conversation. 













level Early Late 
Modded 1.00          
Starting 
Score 0.05 1.00         
Final score 0.43 0.69 1.00        
Karma 0.06 0.91 0.64 1.00       
Short 
comment -0.01 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 1.00      
Long 
comment 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.09 -0.11 1.00     
Anonymous 
user -0.05 -0.80 -0.58 -0.84 0.17 -0.07 1.00    
Top level 0.25 -0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.03 1.00   
Early in 
conversation 0.34 -0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.05 0.32 1.00  
Late in 
conversation -0.24 0.04 -0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.13 -0.25 1.00 
Karma Score 
 The second potential confound is the poster’s karma level. Posters with higher 
karma may be more skilled writers, or better understand and follow the community’s 
norms. Comments from users with higher karma start with higher scores. However, as the 
correlations in Table 5.3 show, users with higher karma were somewhat less likely to post 
at top-level or to post early in a conversation. 
Comment length 
Grice’s maxims for optimal messages (Grice 1969) indicate that messages should 
be long enough to be informative, but not so long as to violate conversational expectations.  
Thus, exceptionally short or long messages may generally be judged to be of lower quality. 
In our dataset, the shortest 10% of messages (which we refer to as “very short messages) 
had fewer than 65 characters and the longest 10% (“very long messages) had more than 
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1089 characters.  As the correlations in Table 3 show, very long comments were more 
frequent later in threads and very short comments had lower starting scores. Other 
correlations, however, were not consistent with message length being a confound: both 
short and long messages were more frequent at top-level than were medium length 
messages. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that starting score, top-level posting, and late posting had 
an impact on moderation, even controlling for the potential confounds identified. Table 5.4 
reports an ordinary least squares regression predicting the final score: positive coefficients 
indicate higher predicted scores. Table 5.5 reports a logistic regression predicting the 
binary outcome of whether a comment will be moderated: positive coefficients indicate 
higher probabilities.  All the coefficients show that top-level comments, early comments, 
and comments with higher starting scores were more likely to receive moderation and to 
get higher final scores, even when controlling for the potential confounds. 
Table 5.4: Ordinary least squares regression predicting final comment scores. 
R-squared 0.52 
 Coef. t P>|t| 
Starting score 1.080 259.68 .001 
Karma 0.002 20.44 .001 
Long comment 0.267 56.90 .001 
Short comment -0.290 -61.08 .001 
Top level 0.234 67.71 .001 
Early comment 0.416 109.91 .001 
Late comment -0.266 -73.81 .001 
Constant 0.157 31.70 .001 
 
 
The R-squared measure of fit for the predictions of final score was .52, suggesting 
that there are differences among comments that are important to moderation outcomes but 
are not captured by the variables in the regression model. Perhaps comments with low 
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starting scores, not at top-level, or posted late in a conversation really are of lower quality, 
but that quality was not captured by the confounds identified above. Two further tests, 
however, suggest that that this is not the complete explanation, and that there is a problem 
of insufficient moderator attention to these comments.  
Table 5.5: Logistic regression predicting if a comment will be moderated. 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 
 Coef. Z P>|z| 
Starting score 0.043 4.14 .001 
Karma 0.007 23.98 .001 
Long comment 0.856 76.78 .001 
Short comment -0.119 -9.75 .001 
Anonymous user 0.167 10.58 .001 
Top level 0.789 99.28 .001 
Early comment 1.324 158.86 .001 
Late comment -1.596 -115.59 .001 
Constant -1.604 -127.95 .001 
 
First, we consider the delay until receiving the first moderation for a comment. 
Since this measure considers only comments that do receive moderation, it should be 
independent of the quality of the comments and reflect only the amount of attention from 
moderators. Table 5.6 shows that comments with higher starting scores received 
moderations sooner. Comments at top-level also received moderation sooner (median time 
to first moderation 46 minutes vs. 120). Comments early in a conversation also were 
moderated sooner (median time to first moderation 22 minutes for early comments, 79 for 
comments in the middle of the conversation, and 288 minutes for late comments.) 
Table 5.6: Lower scoring comments took longer to receive first moderation. 







The second test was to look at the probability of reversing an incorrect moderation, 
as discussed in the previous section. Here, we restrict attention only to incorrect negative 
moderations, as those are the ones that can cause treasures (good comments) to be buried. 
Table 5.7 shows that the lower the current score for a comment, the lower the probability of 
reversing an incorrect moderation, suggesting that moderators attend less to comments with 
lower scores. Comments at top-level were more likely to have incorrect moderations 
reversed (44% vs. 35%). Comments early in a thread were also more likely to have 
incorrect moderations reversed (33% for very early comments, 19% for comments in the 
middle of a thread, and 12% for late comments). 
Table 5.7: Errors were corrected less frequently for comments with lower scores. 
Score of comment 
receiving “unfair” 







Limitations and Future Research 
Additional data and analysis could provide even clearer evidence on the issues 
investigated here. By analyzing the contents of comments to identify typographic elements 
like bullets and bolded text, the presence of links to other comments, or other features, we 
could control for more potential confounds in the analysis of whether late comments, 
comments with lower initial scores, or not at top-level, had less of a chance to achieve high 
scores. With readership logs, we could measure the attention of moderators to particular 
messages rather than using time to moderation and other proxies. If a random sample of 
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Slashdot users rated a sample of comments as to what their final score should be, we could 
measure how frequently the distributed moderation system converged to correct final 
scores.  
With both reader logs and assessments of correct final scores, it might be possible 
to distinguish problems of insufficient moderator attention from information cascades 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1998). That is, we could control for the amount of 
moderator attention and for the community's assessment of the correct final score when 
analyzing whether the previous moderation had any influence on the next moderation. If 
previous moderation still had an effect, it would imply an information cascade that could 
only be remedied by withholding from moderators the results of previous moderations. If 
previous moderation had no effect, then the problem of buried treasures could be remedied 
merely by redirecting moderation attention.  
In addition to refining the analyses of moderation provision presented in this paper, 
in future research we plan to turn our attention to the impacts of moderation on readers and 
writers of comments. To what extent are readers making use of comment scores in 
allocating their attention and how could the scores be used even better? To what extent 
does the moderation system help newcomers to learn the norms of the community, 
encourage valued writers to keep participating, and drive away trolls? 
Design implications 
Slashdot’s design, and the usage patterns that have emerged, highlight tensions 
among four design goals for distributed moderation systems. First, comments should be 
moderated quickly. Second, they should be moderated accurately according to the 
132 
community norms. Third, each individual moderator should have limited impact on any 
particular comment. Fourth, the burden on moderators should be minimized, to encourage 
their continued participation.  
Consider the tension among timeliness, accuracy, and minimizing the influence of 
individual moderators. In the Slashdot system, two to five people (depending on a 
comment’s initial score) must provide positive moderations before a comment reaches a 
score of +4. This limits the impact of any individual moderator. But more than 40% of 
comments that reached +4 took longer than three hours to reach it; in three hours, the 
typical conversation was already half over. An alternative design would give more weight 
to early moderators, which would lead to earlier identification of treasures (and trash) but 
would give more power to those early moderators and lead to more errors caused by items 
having inappropriately high or low scores that would have to be corrected by future 
moderators. 
There is also a tension between minimizing moderator effort on the one hand, and 
timeliness and quality of moderation outcomes on the other hand.  At Slashdot, moderators 
choose which comments to attend to, and only provide feedback on comments that they 
think should be moved from their current score. This minimizes disruption to moderators’ 
usual reading patterns. Our analysis showed, however, that it leads to biases. Comments 
with lower current scores, comments not at top-level, and comments later in a thread 
received slower moderation and lower scores on average than they deserved. 
Alternative designs might cause treasures to be discovered more quickly and 
consistently, at the expense of a little more moderator effort. For example, there could be a 
special moderator’s view of a conversation. It would hide comments below certain 
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thresholds, as with the view presented to other readers. But comments the system had 
flagged as needing additional moderator attention would not be hidden. Recently posted 
comments and those with recent moderation would be flagged. Once a flagged comment 
had been presented to enough moderators, the system would infer from the lack of any 
explicit moderator action that the item was correctly classified and stop highlighting it for 
future moderators. All comments would reach their final score much faster, and the 
problems of uncorrected moderation errors and buried treasures would be reduced 
significantly.  
Conclusion 
Slashdot is an unusual site. Many more people participate in each conversation 
thread than is typical of conversation spaces on the Internet. Slashdot’s mostly tech savvy, 
younger users, may be especially good at using the moderation tools. The design has 
accreted slowly, giving users plenty of time to adapt to it. Rather than limiting the value of 
this analysis, however, we believe these characteristics of Slashdot make it an especially 
valuable site to study. The scale of the site makes moderation a necessity rather than a 
luxury and patterns of moderator behavior that have emerged shed light on the fundamental 
tensions involved in distributed moderation systems. 
Slashdot provides an existence proof that the basic idea of distributed moderation is 
sound. There is widespread participation. There seems to be a broad, though not perfect 
consensus about which comments deserve to be moderated up or down. Comment scores 
are dispersed so that they offer some information of potential value to readers.  
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Closer analysis, however, revealed that it often takes a long time for especially 
good comments to be identified. We also found that incorrect moderations were often not 
reversed, and that later comments, comments not at top-level, and comments with low 
starting scores, did not get the same treatment from moderators as other comments did. 
These findings highlight tensions among timeliness, accuracy, limiting the influence of 
individual moderators, and minimizing the effort required of individual moderators. We 
believe any system of distributed moderation will eventually have to make tradeoffs among 
these goals. There is still room, however, for design advances that require only modestly 
more moderator effort to produce far more timely and accurate moderation overall. 
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Chapter 6                                                               
Conclusion 
 
 The central objective of this research was to examine an online conversation 
rating system “in the wild”; to understand how participants in Slashdot use ratings to 
structure their community.  The work was intended to show how readers use ratings to 
customize their view, how ratings affect new members entering Slashdot, and how 
moderators apply ratings to comments. 
 Online discussions have historically been plagued with the problems of 
information overload (Jones, Ravid et al. 2004) caused by large numbers of participants 
and trouble establishing mutual understanding between participants caused by the 
constrained information channels inherent in text-based interactions (Sproull and Kiesler 
1991; Clark 1992).  Although researchers and designers have applied many solutions to 
these problems in the past, solutions have not typically been applicable to large-scale 
interactions.  Technologically enabled recommendation systems use the past experiences 
of some users to make suggestions to others (Resnick and Varian 1997), and address the 
issues of massive participation without curtailing it. 
 The research described here is designed to show how Slashdot has used a 
recommendation system to shape user participation.  The main body of this dissertation is 
comprised of three inquiries related to rating use on Slashdot.  The first inquiry, as 
described in Chapter 3, examined how readers use ratings to customize how comments 
are displayed.  The second project, described in Chapter 4, described the role comment 
ratings may have in shaping the participation of users new to Slashdot.  The third inquiry, 
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described in Chapter 5, reported on the provision of ratings on Slashdot comments, 
looking specifically at whether comments are sufficiently and fairly rated. 
 In the next section, I briefly review the findings of the three studies. Next, I 
consider the overall significance of these findings in the context of structuring online 
discussions.  I start with instances of the Slashdot rating system that might be generalized 
to other systems, and follow that with a discussion of possible changes that might benefit 
Slashdot moderation.  Third, I describe the limitations of this research and possible 
responses to those limitations.  Finally, I discuss future research in this area that would 
extend this work. 
Findings 
 Before discussing the overall implications of this research, I’ll briefly enumerate 
the findings from the individual studies.  In Chapter 3, I found that comment ratings are 
useful to users, as measured by user survey responses and percentage of users who 
employ ratings to customize how comments are displayed.  I also conclude that there is 
some “friction” that prevents users from readily changing their viewing threshold, given 
that users tend to make large changes to thresholds rather than incremental changes.  
Given that there is something that prevents users from changing thresholds, I recommend 
methods of using the choices of other users to reduce that friction.  The first method for 
reducing friction is to create viewing schemas that support different goals for reading, 
based on the clusters of moderation label modifications made by some users.  For 
example, a view for “Gem Seekers” might be derived from the choices of users who have 
modified those moderation labels that increase the value of “Informative” and 
“Insightful” comments as labeled by the moderation system.  Another method of 
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reducing the resistance to changing viewing thresholds is to model the behavior of “lead 
users”, those users who seem more ready to change viewing thresholds either because 
they are more expert with the system or have lower tolerance for information overload.  
Chapter 3 shows that whether lead users who had previously entered a discussion thread 
had changed their threshold was a significant predictor of whether the new lead user 
would do so.  This indicates it is possible to predict useful, dynamic changes in viewing 
thresholds based on what previous readers of the forum did. 
 Chapter 4 addressed the role of comment rating in shaping new user participation 
behavior.  The chapter describes that whether a new user receives positive, negative, or 
no moderation on their first comment did not predict whether the user would make a 
second comment, or how many comments the user made overall, but did seem to relate to 
how much time passed between posting a first comment and a second.  This chapter also 
examined the role of observation, as measured by user page views, in understanding new 
user behavior.  How many page views a new user had made before posting was not 
associated with the score of their first comment, or how long it took to post a second 
comment, but was related to an increased probability of posting a second comment, the 
score of the second comment, and the total number of comments made.  The conclusions 
drawn from this work is that ratings do provide some measure of feedback, and possible 
incentive, to new users but that other factors like observation also play important roles in 
shaping new user participation. 
 Chapter 5 examined whether comment ratings were sufficiently and fairly 
provided.  This inquiry found that although only 28% of comments received explicit 
ratings, the distribution of scores was reasonably dispersed because of the automatic 
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bonuses given to messages from some users.  Second, we found that moderators 
generally agreed on the disposition of a comment, as measured by the variability of 
ratings on a comment and the meta-moderation scores of ratings.  Third, this work 
described how moderations that were perceived to be unfair by the meta-moderation 
system were more likely to be reversed by subsequent ratings.  Fourth, the chapter 
described how comments posted late in the life of a thread, deeper within a thread or with 
lower starting scores were less likely to get moderated than other comments, meaning 
that ratings are not entirely fairly applied to all comments. 
Discussion 
 In general, the Slashdot moderation system seems to work.  Readers employ the 
ratings to change how they view comments, new users receive some amount of feedback 
from the scores of their comments, survey respondents report high levels of satisfaction 
with the moderation system, and the moderators mostly agree on the disposition of a 
comment when making ratings, and reverse “incorrect” moderations.   
 However, there are still gaps in the overall use of ratings on Slashdot.  First, 15% 
of users chose to customize their readings views to ignore ratings at least once while 
reading Slashdot.  Second, new users may be adversely affected by initial ratings in terms 
of how quickly they post additional comments after their first.  Third, not all comments 
were as likely to receive ratings, meaning that some worthwhile content may be ignored 
because of when and where it was posted rather than the content of the message.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1 in the section on contributions of this work, these findings confim 
potential issues for online rating systems that have been discussed in theoretical 
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descriptions of evaluation systems (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer et al. 1998; 
Avery, Resnick et al. 1999; Dellarocas 2003) 
The usefulness of ratings in online discussions was not obvious before studying 
the Slashdot case.  Although collaborative filtering systems had been applied to online 
discussion previously by GroupLens (Resnick, Iacovou et al. 1994) and demonstrated to 
have some utility for users, they were not widely deployed.  This works extends the 
recommender system literature in two ways.  First, it provides an example of ratings that 
occur on a very different object than is typical in other recommender system applications.  
Much of the work on recommenders has examined ratings of consumer goods, as in 
Epinions and Movielens (Terveen and Hill 2002).  Online discussions are different from 
other “goods” being evaluated in that they can happen over a very brief amount of time, 
meaning that evaluation needs to happen quickly to be useful.  Rating discussion may 
also be different because raters may evaluate a comment both on its quality and on 
whether they agree with its content.  This creates more opportunities for abuse of the 
rating system.  Interestingly, such abuse appears to be rate which does not seem to occur 
given the high level of agreement between Slashdot moderators on the disposition of 
comments. 
Analyzing and describing specific features of the Slashdot moderation system also 
extends the literature on recommender systems by adding new case examples for future 
comparisons and study.  The use of moderation labels rather than just numeric rating, the 
embedded reputation system that is tied to content recommendation and the mechanism 
by which raters only move the score of a comment up or down if they disagree with the 
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current score of the comment are all unique features to the Slashdot rating system, and 
add to our understanding of how these systems may be used.   
As shown in Chapter 3, some readers showed sophisticated use of moderation 
labels to craft comment views that addressed different motivations for reading Slashdot 
forums.  For example, users who enjoyed reading comments labeled as “Troll” could add 
positive weight to those comments and see them.  Other users who chose to decrease the 
score of comments labeled as “Funny” may have been reading comments for a different 
experience than entertainment.  Even though the Slashdot system makes general 
recommendations rather than customized ones through collaborative filtering 
mechanisms, rating labels provide additional meta-information that allows for more 
sophisticated use than typically found in general recommenders.  Chapter 3 recommends 
using moderation labels to create schemas for viewing comments, like “Gem Seeker” or 
“Muck Raker”.   The overall conclusion I draw from the use of these labels is that rating 
metadata can be useful for creating heterogeneous recommendations.  Collaborative 
filtering personalizes recommendations by matching users to like others through 
algorithms that find connections in user preferences (Terveen and Hill 2002).  Using 
rating metadata allows for the Slashdot system to target types of users, rather than the 
whole population of users, as is the practice in general recommender systems, or each 
individual user, as is the practice in collaborative filtering mechanisms. 
Second, pre-rating comments based on the history of the user posting the 
comment allows for a dispersion of scores without depending on every comment in a 
thread receiving attention from moderators.  As shown in Chapter 5, only 28% of 
comments received any moderation during that study period.  Since comments could start 
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anywhere from -1 to +2 based on the identity of the posting user, the moderation system 
acted as a winnower, separating particularly good and bad content from the population of 
comments.  Consequently, relatively low amounts of moderation could still provide 
useful feedback to readers about which comments to read.  The usefulness of pre-rating 
might be extended to use the context in which the comment appears as well as the 
reputation of the user posting it.  For example, a comment posted deeper in a thread 
might receive an additional pre-rating weight based on the score of its parent comment.  
If a sub-thread has a high rate of posting, then comments within that thread might receive 
additional weight, or lose weight if there have been no recent posts within that sub-
thread.   
Limitations 
 Slashdot has developed its system incrementally over several years, and targets a 
particularly technology savvy audience.  As shown in Appendix A, the Slashdot audience 
is largely male, computer expert, familiar with other types of online communication, and 
well-educated.  This audience, though targeted, is also very large, which is not 
consistently true for many other online discussion forums.  These characteristics may 
reduce the ability to generalize findings from Slashdot to other online discussions.  
Particularly, it could be that it is impossible to map the findings from the Slashdot case to 
the design of a new online community, and that technological tools like the Slashdot 
moderation system need to co-evolve with the particular needs of an online social system. 
 Although Slashdot is an exceptional case, it may also act as a “leading edge” 
example of how people will interact as online interactions become more commonplace.  
The Slashdot system may not map wholesale to other online communities, but features 
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like moderation labels and pre-ratings of comments may be usefully employed in future 
designs.  Just as Slashdot borrowed features from Usenet and MUDs, future online 
conversation systems may benefit by using tools that Slashdot has developed. 
 This research uses server log data to infer user behavior and survey data to collect 
user opinions and characteristics.  While these methods were useful for the specific 
questions asked in the individual chapters, they don’t answer more nuanced questions of 
motivation and interpretation.  Methods such as ethnographic interviews and content 
analysis could have been used to answer these more contextual questions.  For example, 
in looking at new user behavior, I only examined the outcome of a user’s first comment 
in terms of how it was rated, not in how good the comment actually was.  In looking at 
reading behavior, I described several uses of moderation labels, but did not learn about 
perceived efficacy of customizing label ratings. 
 Each of the studies that comprise the dissertation depended on cross-sections of 
server logs and user surveys that represent “snapshot” views of behavior on Slashdot.  It 
could be that moderation practices change over time, or that a different set of readers 
constitute the audience of Slashdot now.  Cross-sections of user behavior do not show 
longitudinal changes to participation on the site, which may play an important, 
undetected role in these findings. 
 Selecting the three analyses of ratings use of Slashdot described in this chapter 
required ignoring other important elements of the Slashdot system.  Slashdot, given its 
size and persistence, is a complex socio-technical environment.  Some of the interactions 
not studied here could play an important, undetected role in explaining these findings.  
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These studies focused on the moderation system of Slashdot, but other characteristics of 
the site may be even more important in shaping user behavior. 
Future Research 
 Opportunities for future research can be divided broadly into two categories: 
future research on Slashdot and future research applying these findings to other systems.  
In future studies of Slashdot, there are good opportunities for understanding the context 
of use by employing different methods combined with those used here.  The following 
list explores some additional research questions for ratings use on Slashdot: 
• The role of “trolls”, socially deviant users, in affecting how moderation is enacted 
on Slashdot.  What types of user misbehavior does moderation affect and what 
types does it ignore?  What role does user misbehavior have in the design of 
conversation rating systems?  Using interviews with trolls, editors and Slashdot 
users this study could examine the tactics trolls use to work-around the 
moderation system and how editors respond to those tactics.  Secondary analysis 
of troll comments could be used to determine the success of such tactics. 
• How does a moderation system where users move scores in a “better or worse 
than current score” mechanism differ from absolute ratings?   An implication of 
this mechanism is that some raters may not score a comment because they feel it 
is at the correct level.  This approach may also resolve some of the sufficiency 
issues found in recommender systems by not requiring that every item be rated.  
More work comparing absolute ratings versus this form of rating would be 
valuable to research on recommender systems. 
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• What is the relationship between the topic being commented on and the ratings of 
those comments?  There is some indication that political stories engender more 
contentiously rated comments than technology stories.  Are there other topics that 
will affect the provision of ratings?  Two methods might be combined to address 
these issues.  The first would be a lab study in which lab participants are 
randomly assigned to rate comments from different types of stories and see if the 
overall ratings differ.  The second method would be to look at how moderators 
rate comments in existing threads of different story types and compare the ratings 
using variability within the scores and measures of unfairness in meta-
moderation.   
• Does the final score of a comment constitute its “correct” score?  Since comments 
reach a final score through a series of moderations, and only the moderations 
themselves are meta-rated, it’s unclear whether Slashdot users agree with the end 
dispositions of the comments.  One method of detecting the difference between 
the “true” score and the score achieved by moderation would be to have users 
assign absolute scores to comments and compare those ratings to what scores the 
comments achieved through moderation.  Using surveys and interviews, this 
inquiry would examine how much users trust the ratings of comments. 
• What information do moderators and meta-moderators seek before rating a 
comment?  Raters have the option of seeking information about the user who 
posted the comment, the context in which a previous rating was made and the 
history of moderation labels attached to a comment and more when deciding to 
moderate a comment or meta-moderate a moderation.  This inquiry would use 
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server-log analysis and interviews with active Slashdot moderators to track what 
information, if any, a rater collects before assigning a label to a comment. 
• What variables would be useful in additionally pre-rating comments?  As 
suggested in the discussion section, pre-rating comments plays an important role 
in Slashdot moderation.  Other variables that might be of use in pre-rating a 
comment include the score of parent comment, the average scores of comments in 
the thread, the rate of posting in a sub-thread, and the number of comments in a 
forum.  The research on this subject would compare different variables and 
different weights to see which measures increase comment score dispersion and 
moderator agreement with final scores. 
 
Besides future work on Slashdot, the research described here suggests research 
questions that may be best raised by studying other sites.  These questions include: 
• Can moderation be applied to other online discussion forums?  It is possible that 
Slashdot is a unique case, and rating comments would not work in other contexts.  
Two ways to test this would be to apply a comment rating system to an ongoing 
discussion forum without a rating system, or to create a new online discussion 
system with a moderation system embedded from inception.  Comparing the 
development of rating practices in these two contexts might show the possibility 
of imposing ratings in ongoing systems, or the difficulty in starting rating 
mechanisms in new systems. 
• Are moderation labels useful in other contexts?  One method to study this would 
be to take an online community that currently uses a numerical rating system for 
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content and replace it with a labeled rating system for groups of users.  For 
example, Movielens could replace the familiar 5 star framework for rating movies 
with labels like “Fun” or “Matinee Only”.  Another method would be to create a 
new online community that only uses the moderation labels rather than numerical 
ratings and examine how use develops.  For example, an online community based 
on mental health support might be created and choose to rate content with labels 
like “Inaccurate” or “Supportive”.  Finally, a moderation label system might be 
applied to an existing online community that doesn’t currently use ratings at all.  
For example, Wikipedia might include a rating system with labels like 
“Incomplete” or “Needs revising” to provide cues about which content needs 
more work.  This may be useful for the emerging practice of social tagging or 
“folksonomies”.  These are systems in which users assign labels to content like 
links and pictures, and those labels are used to match participant interests.  The 
site “del.icio.us”16 allows users to assign labels to Web page links and create 
categories based on those tags.  Further research on labeling would help 
understand this emerging practice. 
• What other content metadata can be applied in other settings?  Besides 
moderation labels, user characteristics that determine pre-rated scores were 
important in Slashdot’s moderation system.  Other systems might benefit by using 
comment and user metadata to differentially weigh the rating of content without 
using collaborative filtering.  For example, the site e-thepeople17 allows users to 
rate posts in a political discussion.  A test of this research question might be to 




pre-rate comments based on political leanings imputed from previous rating 
behavior.  This would allow a liberally-oriented reader to see comments rated as 
“High quality conservative”.   A study of the Amazon book review system might 
weigh or sort user books reviews by looking at the history of the user posting the 
book review, like agreement with their previous reviews. 
Conclusion 
 Slashdot provides an example of how an online discussion system employs user 
recommendations to manage the problems of large-scale interactions without losing the 
benefits of such participation.  The increased participation in many-to-many interactions 
and the development of technological tools to help manage those interactions have 
fostered new forms of participation that were not possible in the offline environment.  
However, characteristics of computer-mediated communication that undermine these 
benefits need to be managed in order to realize these innovative interactions.  Ratings 
systems, as used by Slashdot, help to manage large-scale online interaction without 
constraining them such that you lose the benefits of scale. 
 In this dissertation I have shown that comment ratings are useful to readers of 
content, and that they have some effect on participation outcomes for new users.  I have 
also shown that ratings on Slashdot are sufficiently and fairly applied.  However, I have 
also pointed to several areas of improvement that are possible for ratings in this system.  
Readers have some inherent resistance to changing the viewing interface, and would 
benefit from more dynamic changes based on ratings.  New members are also affected by 
how they observe content on the site, which has implications for designing new user 
experiences.  Some comments on Slashdot were not as likely to get rated, so an interface 
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that rewards moderators for finding valued content that might be missed would help the 
overall system. 
 Large-scale online interactions enable new forms of interaction with intriguing 
potential benefits.  Bringing massive attention and resources to a shared environment 
allows for the accomplishment of complex tasks with reduced burden on individual 
contributors.  Recommendation systems, like that used by Slashdot, may be an important 
tool in helping to realize the benefits of those interactions, but is not a panacea for all of 
the issues involved with coordinating online activity.  As online interactions become 
more nuanced and sophisticated, the socio-technical tools we use to structure those 
interactions must keep pace.  Hopefully, recommendation systems continue to develop as 








To add context to the behavioral patterns contained in server logs, this project also 
relied on user characteristic information derived from two surveys of Slashdot users.  One 
survey was targeted towards a group of new users of the site, and a second survey 
sampled the general population of Slashdot users. 
In each survey, users were notified of their invitation to participate through text at 
the top of the index page, as shown in Figure 3-7.  This area is generally reserved for 
notifications of status changes like moderator or meta-moderator privileges, or invitations 
to subscribe to the site.  The instrument itself was coded to operate on the Slashdot site, 
rather than taking users to another site to complete the survey.   
Figure 6.1: The notification area where registered Slashdot users received their invitation 
to participate in the study. 
 
Couper (Couper 2000) describes this type of survey as an “intercept survey”, with 
the sampling frame limited to site visitors.  He identifies the two main concerns with 
intercept surveys as timing when to invite users to participate in the study and the higher 
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possibility for nonresponse bias.  The timing issue involves selecting at what point in 
browsing a site the user is invited to participate in the survey, with Couper 
recommending that potential participants be invited at the beginning of their time on the 
site.  In line with this advice, this study placed the invitation on the first page that users 
would see when logging onto the site, provided they did not follow a link to a section that 
bypasses the main index page.  Nonresponse bias is the potential error in findings 
introduced by the likelihood that participants who responded to the survey have different 
characteristics than those who did not.  Response rates for intercept surveys range 
between 15% and 30% (Couper 2001). 
 
Figure 6.2: Initial survey participation screen 
 
The sampling frame for the survey of new users was a list of all users who had 
created an account between November 1, 2004 and the day the survey first entered the 
field, December 6, 2004.  Survey invitations appeared for a two day period, during which 
time only 3,341 users identified in the dataset visited the site.  233 new users responded 
to the survey, meaning this part of the study had a response rate of 7%.  In this case, the 
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short study period and the type of users being targeted may have had an adverse effect on 
overall response rate. 
The new user survey was designed to elicit demographic information about new 
users, as well as their beliefs about the moderation system.  In particular, this data 
collection was designed to ask about previous experiences that might predict how users 
participate on Slashdot.  Table 3-2 shows the questions that were asked in the new user 
survey, clustered by previous experience demographics and attitudes towards the 




Table 6.1: New user survey questions 
Previous experience 
How much experience do you have participating in online discussion sites? 
How expert do you consider yourself with computers? 
What is your level of education? 
 
Attitude towards moderation system 
Compared to other sites you may have participated on, how would you rate 
discussion on Slashdot? 
How concerned are you about the scores you receive on your comments? 
How much do you agree with the following statement? 
Moderators should use moderation to support particular viewpoints?  
How much do you agree with the following statement?                                             
The moderation system is important for fostering good discussion on Slashdot. 
On average, how deserving are comments that receive very high scores? 
 
Ability to detect/create highly rated comments 
How sure are you that you know what a good comment is on Slashdot? 
How confident are you that you understand why other’s comments are usually 
scored very highly? 
How clear are the expectations for making a quality comment on Slashdot? 




The second online survey conducted on Slashdot was The sampling frame for this 
survey was the list of registered Slashdot users, based on the Slashdot assigned unique 
identifying number.  User identification numbers were compared against IP addresses to 
assure that multiple numbers were not held by single individuals.  Each day a script chose 
10% of the registered Slashdot users to receive an invitation to participate in the survey.   
  Between June 15 and June 20, 2005, 8121 respondents participated in the study.      
The overall response rate for the study period was 19.1%, with some variation per day.  
This is a conservative calculation of response rate for several reasons.  First, it doesn’t 
account for users who were eligible to receive the survey, but did not happen to log in to 
the site during the study period.  Secondly, users who did access the site might have 
missed the invitation to participate in the survey, as it was surrounded by a large amount 
of similar-looking text.  Crawford et al (Crawford, McCabe et al. 2002) compared 
nonresponse in Web and phone surveys, and found that the largest reason given for not 
responding to Web surveys was that users did not remember being invited to do so, or did 
not notice the invitation in the first place.  They also found that those users were willing 
to participate when they realized they were eligible.   
This survey was designed to elicit two types of information: characteristics of 
Slashdot users and attitudes towards the moderation system.  User characteristics can also 
be divided into demographic information, and other online conversation technology 




Table 6.2: Questions in Slashdot user survey 
User demographics 
How expert do you consider yourself with computers? 
What is your level of education? 
How old are you? 
What is your gender? 
 
Online conversation usage 
How much experience do you have participating in online discussion sites? 
On average, how many other news and discussion sites per day do you visit 
besides Slashdot? 
How often in the past week did you engage in sending and receiving email? 
How often in the past week did you engage in instant messaging or IRC? 
How often in the past week did you participate in a Usenet newsgroup? 
How often in the past week did you particpate in Web discussion forums? 
 
Attitudes towards Slashdot and moderation 
How much do you agree with the following statement?                                             
It is easy to find highly rated comments in each story.  
How often do you click through a story to read comments? 
How much do you agree with the following statement?                                             
The moderation system is important in identifying good comments.  
Compared to other sites you may visit, how would you rate discussion on 
Slashdot? 
How important do you think the moderation system is in fostering discussion on 
Slashdot? 
 
General population survey results 
Although the new user survey is targeted to a specific group, the general 
population survey is a good approximation of the demographics and beliefs.  
Consequently, this section will describe the results of the survey, which will then be 
referred to in later chapters. 
User demographics 
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Slashdot users have high levels of self-rated computer expertise, and tend to be 
highly educated.  43% of Slashdot users were in the 25-34 age category, skewing the 
Slashdot audience as younger than the general Internet population (Rainie and Horrigan 
2005).  98% of Slashdot users reported being male, another significant difference from 
general Internet populations, which are currently nearly equally divided between males 
and females.  These statistics paint a picture of a technologically savvy, highly educated, 
male population that mostly confirms popular impressions of the Slashdot audience. 
Figure 6.3: Slashdot survey results - 1 


































































What is your gender? 
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Online conversation usage 
Figure 6.4: Slashdot survey results - 2 
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Web discussion forums? 
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Attitudes towards Slashdot and moderation 
Figure 6.5: Slashdot survey results - 3 
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